Analysis techniques for Smart contracts: generation of complete control flow graphs by Hernández Cerezo, Alejandro
Analysis techniques for smart
contracts: generation of complete
control flow graphs
Te´cnicas de ana´lisis para contratos inteligentes:
generacio´n de grafos de control de flujo completos
Universidad Complutense de Madrid
Facultad de Informa´tica
Trabajo de fin de grado del Doble Grado en
Ingenier´ıa Informa´tica y Matema´ticas
Alejandro Herna´ndez Cerezo
Dirigido por:
Elvira Albert Albiol
Curso 2019-2020

Abstract
Ethereum is the most popular blockchain. It has become really well-known in the last
few years because it lets users deploy their smart contracts on top of it. Gas is used to
measure the computational effort when executing a transaction and to reward miners.
Users set the gas limit when proposing a transaction, and if the miner runs out of gas
before performing it, an out-of-gas exception is raised, reverting to the previous state
before execution. Thus, inferring gas consumption is really important for not losing
resources.
Besides, some exploits have been found that have led to major economic losses, due
to subtle bugs in the code. An example of it is the famous DAO attack.
In order to tackle the efficiency and soundness problems mentioned above, we have to
rely on formal methods that guarantee the soundness and accuracy of possible analysis.
Research has been done previously in this topic, and it has led to the creation of tools
that analyze different features on Ethereum Virtual Machine(EVM) code. Among them,
Gastap is one of the few tools based on static analysis that manages to infer gas upper
bounds for transactions. Gastap is one of the most accurate tools in the field, having a
great success rate. It generates a Control-Flow-Graph (CFG) as an intermediate repre-
sentation of the analysis. However, the current algorithm used by Gastap is not precise.
Therefore, a considerable number of smart contracts cannot be analyzed.
This dissertation proposes a new algorithm for generating a Complete CFG from an
EVM smart contract. We will prove that this algorithm is sound, and prove completeness
is lost only in certain cases.
It greatly improves the performance from the previous version. Experiments corrob-
orate this fact: we have analyzed a total of 10,736 files, generating a CFG from roughly
90%, in contrast with the 80% of the contracts that could be analyzed before. From the
10% remaining, only less than 1% of the contracts still fail due to our analysis. Besides,
we achieve a great efficiency: CFG generation time takes less than 0,01% of the total
time for the analysis.
Another key feature of the proposed algorithm is that it can be easily implemented
and adapted to other stack-based programs.
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Resumen
Ethereum es la cadena de bloques ma´s popular. Se ha convertido en una plataforma
muy conocida en los u´ltimos an˜os, permitiendo a los usuarios desplegar sus dApps en
ella. Ethereum utiliza el llamado Gas para medir el coste computacional de ejecutar una
transaccio´n y as´ı recompensar a los mineros. Para ello, los usuarios tienen que fijar un
l´ımite de gas a la hora de proponer una transaccio´n, de tal forma que si se agota durante
la ejecucio´n, se genera una excepcio´n, y se revierte al estado previo a la ejecucio´n. Es por
ello que determinar el consumo de gas es muy importante para no malgastar recursos.
Adema´s, se han encontrado algunas vulnerabilidades que pueden conducir a grandes
pe´rdidas econo´micas. Un ejemplo de ello es el conocido DAO attack.
Para abordar las situaciones de eficiencia y correccio´n descritas anteriormente, ten-
emos que recurrir a me´todos formales que nos garanticen la precisio´n de posibles ana´lisis.
Se han llevado a cabo diversas investigaciones en este campo, que han llevado a la creacio´n
de distintas herramientas para el ana´lisis de propiedades de los contratos inteligentes.
Entre ellas, destaca Gastap, una herramienta que permite inferir cotas superiores del
consumo de gas de transacciones. Es una de las herramientas con mayor porcentaje de
contratos analizados con e´xito. Para ello, genera un Grafo de control de flujo (CFG) en
una de las etapas intermedias del ana´lisis. Sin embargo, el algoritmo empleado actual-
mente no es preciso, por lo que hay un nu´mero considerable de contratos que no son
analizados correctamente.
Este trabajo propone un nuevo algoritmo para generar un Grafo de control de flujo
completo de un contrato inteligente. Probaremos que este ana´lisis es correcto, y que
perdemos informacio´n u´nicamente en ciertos casos.
Los resultados muestran como el nuevo algoritmo mejora bastante con respecto al
anterior: hemos analizado un total de 10,736 archivos, de los que podemos generar su
CFG para casi un 90%. Con el ana´lisis anterior, e´ramos capaces de generar un 80% de
los casos. Del 10% de contratos restantes, menos del 1% fallan por culpa de nuestro
algoritmo. Adema´s, este algoritmo es muy eficiente, pues supone menos de un 0,01% del
tiempo de ejecucio´n del ana´lisis completo.
Otro aspecto relevante de este algoritmo es que es fa´cilmente implementable, y que
puede ser adaptado a otros lenguajes basados en la pila.
Palabras Clave:
Ana´lisis de Flujo de Datos, Cadena de bloques, Contratos inteligentes, Ejecucio´n Simbo´lica,
Ethereum, Ethereum Virtual Machine, Gas, Grafo de Control de Flujo, Me´todos For-
males, Sema´ntica Operacional .
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Context
The Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) is a stack machine that allows the execution of
smart contracts in the Ethereum blockchain. It executes EVM bytecode, the low-level
language to which high-level instructions compiles to.
The aim of this project is to improve the accuracy of an already existing tool:
EthIR [1]. EthIR is a framework that generates a high-level rule-based representa-
tion (RBR) from low-level EVM bytecode. This representation is crucial for other tools
to infer properties related to the EVM code, such as Gastap [2] or SAFEVM [3].
Gastap is a tool that infers parametric gas bounds from an EVM contract. This upper
bound can depend on the sizes of the input parameters of the functions, the contract state,
and/or the blockchain data that the gas consumption depends upon.
EthIR relies on Oyente*, an intermediate tool contained in EthIR that generates
a control flow graph (CFG) of the program. This tool is built on top of Oyente [4],
another tool that generates a CFG and analyzes smart contracts so as to find possible
vulnerabilities. However, this analysis is not sound nor complete, as it has a fixed number
of iterations to generate the information from the contract. It also skips some of the
information needed for generating the CFG in some cases.
Oyente* has removed these constraints as an attempt to generate a complete CFG,
and has made other changes to ensure needed data is obtained. However, current analysis
introduces unfeasible paths in our graph, leading to inaccuracies in Gastap analysis.
This document will propose a new sound analysis, taking into account the particular-
ities of the EVM architecture. Completeness cannot be achieved, as EVM bytecodes may
contain persistent information that cannot be resolved in a static analysis. Nevertheless,
we will also prove that we lose the completeness only in certain cases.
Definitions, analysis and results from this dissertation are planned to be published in
an international forum. Currently, we have published an arxiv paper [5]. Most of the
definitions and some results are the same in both this project and the report. Neverthe-
less, the analysis proposed in this dissertation is original, and has been improved through
the contributions of all authors in the paper. My main contributions are the implemen-
tation of the algorithm, the development of the proofs for soundness and completeness,
improvements in some of the definitions to perform the analysis and the proposed jump
semantics. I have also contributed to the design of experiments for the new version of
Gastap, creating the bash files to carry out experiments and controlling everything went
smoothly. New examples have been added in this document, to contribute to a broader
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understanding on how the algorithm works. Besides, a new case study for Gastap has
been added, in order to highlight the strengths and limitations this tool has.
We are aware that the reader may not be familiarized with some of the concepts
mentioned above. An explanation of all of them will be provided in Chapter 3.
1.2 Motivation
Data-flow analysis is one of the main techniques used by compilers to optimize a program
or to run static analysis. It consists in obtaining the possible values memory may have
at different points of the program.
One way to construct this data-flow is by obtaining the control-flow graph (CFG)
from a program. A control-flow graph is a directed graph that represents the flow of a
program during its execution: paths found in a CFG correspond to possible flows.
Nodes represent the basic blocks of the program, i.e. subsets of instructions that
are always executed uninterruptedly and with no jump instructions within it. Edges
represent the possible jumps between different basic blocks. For the sake of brevity, from
this point we will be denoting basic blocks as simply blocks.
In many different low-level languages, computing a CFG is really easy. Many of these
languages specify directly the target of branch instructions, and therefore, nodes and
edges can be easily identified:
• The first instruction of a block is either the initial instruction of the program, the
target of a conditional or non-conditional jump instruction, or the instruction that
follows a branch instruction.
• The final instruction of a block can be the Jump instruction itself, an exception
instruction or the last instruction of the program.
Edges are constructed by joining each node containing a jump instruction with another
block that starts with the target address from that jump.
We know that this description may not cover all different cases for blocks in many
languages, but we want to emphasize that knowing statically the target of branch in-
structions makes the generation of CFG trivial.
However, there are other mechanisms to handle jumps. In particular, in some lan-
guages, the address of a branch instruction is determined in the moment of the execution.
For instance, some stack-based languages can store beforehand the values of jumps in the
stack, and once a branch instruction is executed, they retrieve the address from the top
of it.
In these cases, generating a CFG becomes really tricky. Now we cannot keep track
of the possible jump values. Thus, there is no direct way to determine how nodes are
connected in the graph.
A possible solution involves executing the program to obtain these values, annotate
all the possible jump addresses a block can jump to, and add an edge for each of these
possibilities. However, this approach introduces several unexpected problems we need to
cope with.
The first problem has to do with those languages in which dynamic values that cannot
be inferred through static analysis are involved. For instance, we can find this problem
when accessing a memory that contains persistent information that was stored before
considering the static analysis.
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We didn’t have this problem with static jumps, as these instructions didn’t have any
impact in the generation of the CFG. However, now branch instructions can depend on
them. So if we simply tried to execute the program, we could reach a point in which a
value is needed in order to resolve a jump instruction, but we have no way to obtain it.
At this point, the execution would fail.
This problem can be overcome using symbolic execution. This way, instead of execut-
ing the code per se, we contemplate the possibility that certain values may be undefined,
and we explore every possibility once we need to manage them. The analysis would still
fail if target address is unknown though. Nevertheless, there are other situations in which
analysis would normally halt, but now we can deal with: conditional jumps that rely on
dynamic values in order to decide whether to take them or not. In this case, we would
explore both possibilities.
This approach has also a big downsize. Exploring every possibility also leads to
inadvertently introduce program flows that cannot appear through regular execution.
Then we would introduce more edges than expected in our CFG, and some of the paths
in our graph would represent unfeasible flows. At this point, we lose accuracy in the
analysis.
Nevertheless, the same problem can be found in other languages that include condi-
tional branch instructions. In both cases, it is really difficult to overcome this problem,
as determining these dynamic values becomes totally impossible in practice. A possible
solution would involve using a SMT-Solver to try to infer whether a condition in a jump
instruction is always true or false and avoid exploring unfeasible conditions. However,
this wouldn’t necessarily cover all the cases.
The second problem has to do with the paths we can find in a CFG. Static branch
instructions guarantee that any path found from an entry point to a terminating node is
feasible: all edges correspond to fixed jumps, and therefore it doesn’t matter the execution
of instructions in the node, because jump addresses will always be the same. We know
that this is not true in conditional jumps, so we will omit these cases for the rest of this
section.
The reasoning above doesn’t hold anymore with a stack. We can see in the following
example how non-existing paths can be found when obtaining paths in the CFG:
345
481
658
123
341 728
(a) Initial CFG
345 [341]
481 [[123, 341],[123,768]
658 [768]
123 [[341], [768]]
341 [] 728 []
(b) Initial CFG with annotated
stacks
345 [341]
481_0 [123,768]
658 [768]
481_1 [123,341]
123_0 [768] 123_1 [341]
341 []728 []
(c) Cloned CFG
Figure 1.1: Example of CFG showing how ambiguous paths can be found
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Example 1.1. In Figure 1.1a , we can see a certain flow in a CFG. We will assume
there is an entry point connected to blocks 345 and 658, but will be omitted for the sake
of making the example clearer. We can find four different paths within the graph:
• 345 7→ 481 7→ 123 7→ 341
• 658 7→ 481 7→ 123 7→ 341
• 345 7→ 481 7→ 123 7→ 728
• 658 7→ 481 7→ 123 7→ 728
If we include all the possible stack values at the beginning of those nodes, we have the
following situation, depicted in Figure 1.1b
It is clear that from the paths discovered above, two of them are feasible and two of
them don’t represent real paths.
The way we are addressing is by cloning those nodes that are common to different
paths, but can lead to ambiguous flows appearing. Cloning means that we duplicate com-
mon nodes, one per possible feasible path. This way, we ensure different paths cannot
have common nodes, and we prevent ambiguous paths to appear. These nodes share the
same instructions, but from the perspective of the graph, they are totally independent.
In the example above, there are two paths that share nodes 481 and 123. By cloning
them, we obtain the graph shown in Figure 1.1c.
It is easily followed that only two paths can be found, which corresponds to those that
are feasible.
Now we may wonder how to perform the cloning. A naive approach could consist in
generating the CFG without addressing this problem, and make a copy of each block per
shared path. Then, we could link an edge for each copy to a copy of the next block in
the original graph. In simple cases like the example above, this algorithm seems to work
fine.
However, if we have cycles in the initial CFG, it isn’t really clear how to perform
the analysis. Next example illustrates a situation in which we make more copies than
expected.
Example 1.2. Figure 1.2 shows a CFG from a real contract if the cloning problem isn’t
considered and its version with our proposed algorithm. Note that we cannot just clone
the node 361 and join it to each of its matching nodes. As we can see in the cloned
version, there are 5 copies of this node, while we would expect just 3 different copies to
appear.
This example aims to show why cloning cannot just be performed by duplicating each
node for each edge that is pointed. Instead, we need to keep track of the stack during the
symbolic execution, as it reveals hidden paths that cannot be discovered directly from the
final CFG representation.
We will use this example in Chapter 4 for performing our algorithm. Its related code
can be found in Figure 3.1.
From this example, it is followed that we need to keep track of the stacks for each
block. One easy approach would consist in modifying the nodes of the CFG, so they
represent the combination of a basic block and a stack associated before executing the
instructions. From now on, we will use the term node in a CFG to denote the combination
1.2. MOTIVATION 5
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Figure 1.2: Comparative between a program CFG, and its cloned version
of a basic block of instructions and an input stack. Then, a direct edge would join a node
with another one if the first node’s jump target matches the second’s block initial address,
and the stack obtained after executing the instructions in the first node is the same as
the initial one in the second node.
In this dissertation, we will propose an algorithm based in the ideas mentioned above.
In particular, we will try to address the following points:
• Develop an algorithm that takes an EVM program as an input, and generates CFG
as an output. This algorithm has to resolve the cloning issue, ensuring ambiguous
paths cannot be found in the CFG.
• Introduce some definitions and ideas that can be useful for carrying out similar
analysis with other languages.
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• Guarantee the termination of the analysis, and show that it is also efficient.
• Prove our analysis is sound. This way, we will ensure that for each possible program
flow, it exists its corresponding path in our CFG.
• Determine and prove those cases in which accuracy is lost with our analysis. In
order to achieve this goal, we are going to define a semantics that overestimates the
real semantics, and prove completeness. Therefore, we know the loss of accuracy is
produced as a result of the overestimation, which can be tracked down. In partic-
ular, we will prove that the only source of overestimation comes from conditional
jump instructions that are always taken or skipped. This problem is also present
in languages based in fixed jumps, so this way we manage to resolve all problems
intrinsically associated to deal with jumps in a stack.
• Propose an efficient implementation from the analysis, and discuss the details.
We have previously discussed briefly the main features a language must have in order
to be considered. Now we are going to formally specify the requirements needed for our
proposed algorithm:
• Branch instructions operands are obtained from a global stack, that is previously
introduced through a PUSH instruction and no arithmetical instructions are involved
in obtaining this value.
• Branch instructions determine the target address at the moment they are executed.
Note that we can also have other architectural structures, such as memory or registers.
They don’t interfere in the analysis, as long as they don’t have any impact on how jumps
are resolved.
In our case, instead of studying a general language, we will focus on EVM, the virtual
machine Ethereum uses for deploying contracts and executing transactions.
1.3 Contributions
This dissertation proposes a method for generating a control-flow graph (CFG) without
ambiguity, by cloning blocks that are contained in different paths. Thus, the following
chapters have been included:
• Chapter 2 is introductory, it gives a brief description of data-flow analysis and
Solidity. Data-flow analysis provides the theoretical basis of our proposed analysis
and the Solidity language shows some of the capabilities of smart contracts.
• In Chapter 3, we present a general overview of EVM code behaviour and the features
we need to consider for running the analysis. CFG generation relies on determining
the possible jump directions, which exclusively depends on the stack. For proving
the correctness of the analysis, we also introduce an EVM semantics based on stack
states. These semantics focuses on the semantics of basic stack operations (PUSHx,
DUP x, SWAP x), while all other operations just change the size of the stack.
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• In Chapter 4, we propose a method to obtain a non-ambiguous CFG. It takes an
EVM program as an input, and iteratively obtains the contents of the stack for each
program point. Then, each block is cloned for each stack associated to its first
instruction, and edges of the CFG are added by checking whether the output stack
of a cloned block and the input stack of one of the copies of next block match.
• Chapters 5 and 6 give detailed proofs of soundness and completeness of our analysis
respectively, by using the semantics defined in Section 3.3.1. Soundness can also be
extended to EVM semantics, whereas completeness only works for our simplification.
Nevertheless, by proving completeness, we find out which cases are the ones that
have been over-approximated with our analysis.
• All the proposed changes have been included in Oyente*, a tool that obtains a
CFG representation from EVM code integrated in Gastap. Oyente* is included
in EthIR project, as CFG is an intermediate product obtained for constructing a
rule-based representation of blocks that is later used in Gastap, the tool whose
performance we are trying to improve. A CFG generated by Oyente* is obtained
by symbolic execution, and doesn’t consider duplicating nodes. Thus, non-existing
paths may be obtained from this representation, which can lead to inaccuracy issues
in other tools that rely on it. Commits are reflected in Github repository, where
detailed instructions about installation and usage can be found. Explanations of
Gastap architecture, Oyente* implementation and a case of use of Gastap will
be included in Chapter 7.
• In Chapter 8, we present the results of the experiments, comparing the performance
of the algorithm using Oyente* before and after including our algorithm, and the
overall performance of Gastap. We have analyzed a total of 10,796 files.
• Finally, we present the conclusions of this project, as well as the modifications that
will be considered for further development in Chapter 9.

Chapter 2
Foundations
In this chapter, we introduce briefly some of the concepts we will be using in later chapters
and that are background knowledge for this dissertation: data-flow analysis and Solidity.
EVM will be discussed in Chapter 3, as we need to analyze in more depth its properties
and introduce some related definitions in order to formalize the proposed analysis.
Solidity section assumes the reader is familiarized with some of the concepts related
to smart contracts and Ethereum. If this is not the case, its better to skip Section 2.2
and return once Chapter 3 has been read.
2.1 Data-flow analysis
Data-flow analysis is a static analysis technique that aims at obtaining information about
the properties of a program at different program points. This information can be later
used for several purposes, such as program optimization, program debugging, or checking
whether a certain program point can be reached or not.
A data-flow value for a program point is a set of program values that can be obtained
at that point. The set of these values represents the domain we are considering for our
analysis. For instance, if we want to study all possible variable assignments at certain
point, a data-flow value represents a set of possible variable assignments when reaching
that program point.
Data-flow analysis is based on the study of the flow of data along program execution
paths. For that purpose, instructions are grouped into basic blocks, i.e. sequences
of instructions that are always executed together. This way, a path corresponds to a
sequence of basic blocks B1 7→ B2 7→ ... 7→ Bn, such that the data-flow values at the
beginning of block Bi correspond to the final data-flow values of block Bi−1.
Usually, the execution paths are represented through a Control-Flow graph. It consists
of a graph representation of the possible flows of the program, where its nodes represent
the basic blocks, and its edges represent the flow between different nodes. This way,
the propagation of values between different blocks can be performed. As we have stated
previously, it is usually very easy to generate this graph directly from the code. This
graph can contain cycles, representing the possibility of infinite paths.
Then, using the information from the Control-Flow graph, we can define the prec
function, which is a function that given a block, obtains its possible previous blocks
considering all execution paths:
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prec(Bi) = {Bj | ∃ a program execution path s.t. B0 7→ ... 7→ Bj 7→ Bi...}
There are two different types of analysis, depending on whether we are interested
in propagating information backwards (Backward problems) or forward (Forward prob-
lems). From this point, we will consider only Forward problems, as we are interested in
propagating values forward.
Following this approach, we can define a set of data-flow equations, two for each block
Bi:
in(Bi) =
⊔
Bj∈prec(Bi)
out(Bj)
out(Bi) = τi(in(Bi))
where τi(S) is the corresponding transfer function of that analysis, a function that
given a set of data-flow values, obtains the corresponding data-flow values after executing
all the instructions in the block according to its semantics.
We also need to define unionsq operator, to combine data-flow values from different prede-
cessors.
When solving these equations, we generate all the in/out data-flow values for each
block. The information at a certain point inside a block is easily obtained by applying
the transfer function to the data-flow values at the beginning of that block.
Note that several solutions may satisfy the equations above. Solutions correspond to
fixed point of the propagation function our equations define. In some cases, we might be
interested in the greatest fixed point or the least fixed point, depending on the particular
analysis. In our case, we are interested in computing the least fixed point, so we will
introduce the requirements needed for computing this value.
A possible algorithm consists in initializing the sets in and out and evaluate all the
equations until a fixed point is reached, i.e. until the whole system stabilizes.
In order to perform this algorithm, we first need to identify the possible entry points
i.e. the set of all possible instructions that can be executed first. Their associated blocks
correspond to the first block in an execution path B0, so we have to initialize in(B0) to
a proper value if we want to guarantee that correct results are obtained. The remaining
blocks can be initialized to the empty set.
However, this is not sufficient to guarantee that a fixed point will be obtained through
this procedure. We need to introduce a partial order v in our domain D, such that (D,v)
is a complete lattice, i.e. unionsqY exists for any subset Y . It is also required that the transfer
function τ is monotone according to the complete lattice. Besides, if we want to guarantee
that the algorithm converges, infinite chains cannot exist.
Therefore, an instance of a data-flow analysis must include the following elements:
1. A CFG, so that we have a representation for the execution paths in our program.
2. A complete lattice (D,v), which must also guarantee no infinite chains can be
found.
3. Initial data-flow values for those blocks that represent the beginning of a path.
4. An operator unionsq, so that we can combine information from predecessors.
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5. A transfer function τn for each block n in the CFG, to propagate the values following
the instruction semantics. This function must be monotone according to the partial
order.
Our analysis differs slightly from the idea above. We are trying to generate a CFG
following a data-flow analysis, and therefore, we cannot generate beforehand all the equa-
tions in the system, as we cannot delimit the boundaries of the basic blocks nor to define
the prec function. Instead, equations will be generated while performing the propagation,
and there will be a in and out function for each program point.
Once the solution is obtained, we will be able to build a CFG. The initial point of a
block corresponds to either the entry points, or to those program points that have several
equations tied to them, which means they have several predecessors. The final point
of a block correspond to end instructions, jump instructions or those points which next
point corresponds to the beginning of another block. An edge joins each node with its
successors and predecessors.
2.2 Solidity
Most of the information discussed in this chapter has been directly adapted from Solidity
documentation [6]. Solidity is constantly evolving and adding new features, so it is difficult
to find other up-to-date references.
Solidity is a high-level programming language that allows users to create smart con-
tracts that can be later compiled to bytecode and run on the Ethereum Virtual Machine
(EVM). It is an object-oriented language, which resembles C++, Python and JavaScript.
It is also a Turing-Complete language, allowing users to develop smart contracts as
expressive as they need. This is the main advantage over Bitcoin, which only allows
executing basic transactions.
It supports inheritance, and includes some complex data structures, such as mappings,
arrays or user-defined structs. It also allows creating Events, which is a functionality
Solidity includes to generate log information for a transaction. They are stored in a
special data structure in the blockchain, and they can be accessed externally. Applications
can also subscribe to a certain event in a contract, so whenever it is triggered, they are
notified of the contents of the log.
Solidity is compiled into EVM bytecode by the solc compiler. This compiler also can
estimate the gas consumption of a transaction in case this consumption is constant.
Solidity files contain one or several contracts. These contracts can be either normal
contracts, or other special ones called libraries and interfaces.
First line in source files usually includes a pragma declaration, that allows enabling
or disabling certain features in the compiler by stating the versions of the compiler that
support current declarations. This feature is included to ensure compilation declarations
cannot produce errors due to incompatibilities with other versions.
Contracts can be created via a transaction, or from a call from another Solidity con-
tract. Contracts can contain a constructor function, which is a function that will be
only invoked when deploying the contract. Once a contract is created, all the informa-
tion about public and external functions becomes visible, and the code is stored on the
blockchain.
Functions included in a contract can have four different types of visibilities, depending
on the cases they can be called. These four values are external, public, internal and
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private. Nevertheless, all functions are visible to external observers, as they are stored in
the blockchain.
Multiple data types are supported by Solidity: boolean, integer, unsigned integer or
string. Integers and unsigned integers can have different sizes, from 8 to 256 bits in steps
of 8 bits. Arithmetic and bitwise operations can be performed, as well as other operations
such as exp or modulo.
It is also included a new type called address, that represents Ethereum addresses.
It has two different forms: address, that represents a plain address; or address payable,
which allows the user to send Ether to that address.
Data can be allocated in three different structures: memory, storage and calldata.
Memory’s lifetime is limited to an external function call, whereas storage values are
persistent through different transactions. Calldata is a special structure, that is used to
store and retrieve the parameters of a function call.
In previous versions, data location could be omitted. However, in new versions, an
explicit location must be given for complex types. In our case, we are working with
contracts in a version prior to 0.5.0, so our examples don’t include this explicit behaviour.
Contracts also contain some special variables and functions, that are used for meta
information about the blockchain or other capabilities. For instance, we can obtain the
address of the sender of the current transaction through msg.sender or obtain the gas
left through gasleft.
We haven’t discussed into much detail some of the definitions above, as a full overview
is included in EVM section, in Chapter 3. EVM bytecodes correspond to the compilation
of Solidity code, so most of the structures and data types we have mentioned have its
correspondent low-level version, that are managed through EVM instructions.
Two examples of Solidity code be found in Figures 3.1 and 7.3.
Chapter 3
Ethereum Virtual Machine
3.1 Overview
Smart contracts are computer programs deployed in a blockchain that can store values
and also contain functions whose execution cannot be falsified. This technology opens a
wide variety of opportunities, probably being economic transactions the most notorious
ones. More and more applications are starting to rely on blockchain, as it provides a safe
and trusted network for making transactions.
Nowadays, Ethereum has become the most popular platform to deploy smart con-
tracts. Ethereum allows any user to deploy a contract easily, and have it added to a
block. Blocks take around 13s to be included in the Ethereum blockchain. This is incred-
ibly fast, taking into account that it needs to be replicated worldwide. Thus, roughly a
million transactions are carried out every day. This data can be looked upon Etherscan
website [7].
Ethereum allows developers to deploy their dApps on top of its platform. Miners
compete to validate and include transactions in a block, which will be later added into
the blockchain. The first person to solve a difficult hashing problem is the one that
includes the transaction, and who will be rewarded for mining. This approach is called
Proof of Work, which tries to solve the Byzantine fault, by setting a difficult problem to
solve but easy to check. If a malicious node tries to falsify a transaction in the network,
it will take longer to figure out a solution for the problem in comparison with trustful
nodes. So when it wants to share its information with other nodes, its chain of blocks
will be shorter than the ones trustful nodes have, and therefore, such false information
will be rejected.
This approach is really power consuming, and Ethereum is planning to shift into Proof
of Stake: instead of forcing validators to compete, it lets them mine blocks if they own a
certain participation in the system. The more participation you hold, the higher chance
you have to validate a transaction.
Ethereum uses the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) to run smart contracts. Each
node in the network has its own instance of EVM, which allows anybody to deploy their
own smart contracts. Coders usually program in high-level program languages, such as
Solidity or Vyper. Then high level code is translated into EVM bytecode instructions,
which are run by EVM. This way, portability is ensured.
EVM is a stack-based, big endian virtual machine that works with 256-bit words. It
allows users to create contracts, or send transactions to existing contracts, which can
carry payload for specifying the interaction with the contract or additional information.
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For instance, function calls are specified by using the first 4 bytes of data sent with a
transaction, using the four first bytes of the SHA3 representation of the function signature.
When contracts are created, a constructor function will be invoked. This function will
be only invoked at this point, and no further transactions can invoke it. Nevertheless,
the entry point of the smart contract will be always the first bytecode, so there is no
distinction between creating a contract or running a transaction.
Handling data is really tricky, as there are four different ways to deal with it. We have
already mentioned the first one: when carrying out a transaction, it can have a dataload
associated that can be accessed through CALLDATALOAD, CALLDATASIZE and CALLDATACOPY
instructions.
The three other ways involve different data structures that can be used to store data.
The first one is the stack, which only stores uint256 values. It is mainly used to perform
the execution: opcodes retrieve their operands from the stack, and it is also used to store
function arguments and return addresses. Therefore, in order to perform our analysis,
we will need to understand deeply how it works, and propose an abstraction. Nearly all
opcodes modify the stack, but we want to remark those that are used to manage directly
its content: PUSHx v, DUPx, SWAPx and POP, with the usual meaning.
Finally, there are two other structures that can be used by programmers to store
values. The first one is called memory, which is a non persistent array of uint8 values.
These values are lost between different transactions, and can be managed through MLOAD,
MSTORE and MSTORE8 opcodes. The second one is called storage, which is a persistent
associative map which uses uint256 as both keys and values. All global variables that we
declare in our contract are stored in this structure. It can be accessed through SLOAD and
STORE.
We might wonder why making a explicit separation between memory and storage. We
will study later that executing an opcode has an implicit cost associated. Working with
the storage has a higher cost associated because these data is stored in the blockchain,
thus encouraging developers to use their resources wisely.
One of the main properties of EVM is being a Turing-complete language. This feature
allows smart contracts to be as expressive as we want, being able to use loops or other basic
structures to program. However, it also arises several problems, for instance being able
to create contracts that cannot terminate. This is a usual problem for any programming
language, but it becomes even more serious in Ethereum, as miners are the ones that run
transactions and resources are limited.
There is also the issue of incentivizing people to become miners. More miners in the
network, more secure and fast the system becomes. As Ethereum currently works under
Proof of Work, the reward must be worthy to encourage people to compete.
We will see in next subsection how both issues are dealt in Ethereum.
3.2 Gas
Ethereum proposes a way to avoid non-terminating executions and reward miners by
introducing gas into the system. Gas is a unit that measures the amount of computational
effort it is needed to execute each EVM instruction.
Each EVM bytecode has a gas cost associated, that can be either constant or that
depends on some parameter. For instance, creating a contract costs 21000 units of gas.
Then, when miners execute a transaction and include it in a block, they are awarded an
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amount of gas dependent on the operations executed.
The gas doesn’t have a monetary value per se: the sender of the transaction fixes the
conversion between gas and ether, which is the Ethereum official token, when sending the
transaction. This value is usually set to 20 Gwei, a unit of ether. If the sender wants to
make sure the contract is mined really fast, then by setting a high gas price, it makes it
more appealing for possible miners.
Senders also must set a gas limit beforehand. This limit provides a way to avoid non-
terminating executions: the execution of the contract will be aborted once this limit is
exceeded and the system state will be reverted to the initial one. However, this transaction
will still be recorded in the ledger, and the execution fee will be still paid to the miner.
In case the execution is successful and there is some remaining gas available, this gas
will be returned to the sender by using the conversion to ether.
It seems clear then that estimating the possible amount of gas spent on a transaction
is really useful beforehand. Most opcodes have a constant gas fee associated, so in many
cases it is really easy to determine this value. However, there are other opcodes that
depend on parameters, so inferring an upper bound for gas limit becomes really difficult.
In fact, Solidity compiler solc can estimate the amount of gas spent in those cases in
which this value is constant. Otherwise, it just infers gas limit is +∞.
A naive solution consists of just setting a really high gas limit to ensure we won’t be
facing a shortage situation. This way, all non-spent gas would just be returned to the
owner. However, there are two possible flaws in this approach:
• Ether is spent before submitting the transaction, once we have settled both the
gas price and the gas limit. If gas limit is high then we would require a big initial
investment beforehand, so we need to have more Ether and sender won’t be able to
recover it until a miner has validated the transaction.
• Transactions with high gas limit are less appealing for miners. Transactions are
stored in blocks that are later added to the blockchain. These blocks have a gas
limit, and miners can only add more transactions to the block while this limit is
not exceeded. They can dismiss a transaction directly if the remaining capacity of
their current block is exceeded or if they hint that most of the gas will be returned.
It is clear that the best case scenario is the one that sets a limit that guarantees the
final execution, but returns as little gas as possible.
Some tools address this problem, trying to infer an upper bound that may depend
on some parametric value. Among them, we can find Gastap, that relies on EthIR for
obtaining the RBR representation. In this context, it is clear that ensuring the generation
of CFG is vital for correctly finding the gas limit: inaccuracies may lead to the inability
to obtain an upper bound and to gas limit estimations that cannot ensure the execution.
As explained, this can lead to major economic losses.
3.3 EVM Semantics
Defining a complete EVM semantics is a really difficult task. We have to model stack,
memory and storage, being the last one really difficult to analyze, as it is persistent
between transactions and therefore, we cannot keep track of all values that have been
stored within it. As we are focusing in how jumps are managed, then we can define an
overestimated semantics that just takes into account how stack evolves through execution.
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There is a possible major inconvenience when only focusing on the stack: there could
be some jump values that are somehow obtained from the storage or the memory, and
as we are just omitting it, we cannot deduce the jump address. As we will see in Sec-
tion 8.2, there is only one specific type of contracts in which branch target is obtained
from memory: those that involve high order functions. It only represents a small fraction
of all contracts considered (less than 0,01%).
In fact, in all other cases, jump target address is obtained directly from a PUSHx
instruction. Other instructions that can modify this value in the stack are SWAPx and
DUPx, whereas we can just ignore the bitwise or arithmetic operations.
We should also note that not all values pushed to the stack can be eventually a branch
address. EVM has a special opcode to denote the possible jump destination from a branch
opcode: JUMPDEST. This will help us reduce our analysis, as we just need to consider all
those stack values whose associated opcode (if any) is a JUMPDEST instruction.
Before starting with the definitions, we will introduce the example we will be using
to illustrate our analysis:
Example 3.1. Example 1.2 shows contract Sum associated CFGs. In next chapters, we
are going to analyze in depth this contract and apply our proposed algorithm.
It contains four different functions that make several calls to function hola, thus
generating paths that share nodes, but end in different routes, as we have previously
discussed.
Figure 3.1 shows the Solidity code, and a subgraph of the CFG, containing the corre-
sponding opcodes for each of the blocks.
Nodes correspond to the different blocks of code, and edges represent the possible ex-
ecution paths. In our example, there are two type of nodes. The white nodes represent
those nodes that won’t be cloned, and the gray ones represent the nodes that need to be
cloned.
There are also two type of edges: solid edges represent the path that starts from block
73 and dashed edges the one that starts from A0. These two entry points correspond to
publicly invoking the function __callback and invoking from function suma, respectively.
The end directions 92 and A9 are pushed in instructions marked with a black and blue
star respectively. In this Chapter, we will be using the hexadecimal notation, whereas our
generated CFGs use decimal notation instead. This explains why previous directions don’t
appear in Example 1.2: blocks 73 and A0 correspond to blocks 115 and 323, respectively.
Note that this separation isn’t made explicit before performing the proposed analysis.
This example reflects how different non-feasible paths could be found if we didn’t make an
explicit separation. 
Firstly, we will study how EVM programs are structured.
Definition 3.1 (EVM program). An EVM program P = {b0...bn} is a set of bytecodes
b0...bn.
These bytecodes have arbitrary size, depending on the instruction they encode. There-
fore, not every bytecode represents an instruction. We are using size(b) to refer to the
number of bytes an instruction increments the value of the program counter after being
executed. Most bytecodes increment this number only by one unit, but there are other
opcodes, such as PUSHx v that adds the word v of x bytes to the stack. In this case,
size(PUSHx) = x+1.
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1
2 pragma solidity ˆ0.4.11;
3
4 contract Sum {
5
6 function suma () returns (uint sol ) {
7 sol = 0;
8 for(uint i = 0; i < 5; i++)
9 sol = sol+11;
10 hola() ;
11 adios(10);
12 }
13
14 function hola() {
15 uint i = 0;
16 i = i+15;
17 }
18
19 function adios(uint m) {
20 uint c = 14;
21 c = c+m;
22 comer(c);
23 }
24
25 function comer(uint x) {
26 x = x∗x;
27 hola() ;
28 }
29
30 }
JUMPDEST
PUSH1 0x00
PUSH1 0X0e
SWAP1
POP
. . . .
PUSH2 0x0117
DUP2
PUSH2 0x0159
JUMP
Block 103Block 73
Block 143
JUMPDEST
POP
PUSH2 0x0092
PUSH1 0x04
DUP1
CALLDATASIZE
SUB
DUP2
ADD
. . . .
POP
PUSH2 0x0103
JUMP
JUMPDEST
DUP1
DUP2
MUL
SWAP1
POP
PUSH2 0x0166
PUSH2 0x0169
JUMP
Block 159
JUMPDEST
PUSH2 0x0155
PUSH1 0x0a
PUSH2 0x0103
JUMP
Block 14B
JUMPDEST
PUSH1 0x00
DUP1
SWAP1
POP
PUSH1 0x0f
DUP2
ADD
SWAP1
POP
POP
JUMP
Block 169
JUMPDEST
POP
JUMP
Block 166
JUMPDEST
POP
POP
JUMP
Block 117
JUMPDEST
POP
SWAP1
JUMP
Block 155
Block A9
JUMPDEST
PUSH 0x40
MLOAD
. . . .
SUB
SWAP1
RETURN
Block 92
JUMPDEST
STOP
JUMPDEST
PUSH2 0x014b
PUSH2 0x0169
JUMP
Block A0
JUMPDEST
POP
PUSH2 0x00a9
PUSH2 0x011b
JUMP
JUMPDEST
PUSH1 0x00
. . . .
SWAP1
POP
Block 11B
JUMPDEST
PUSH1 0x05
. . . .
PUSH2 0x0143
JUMPI
Block 127
PUSH 0x0b
DUP3
. . . .
PUSH2 0x0127
JUMP
Block 131
Figure 3.1: Solidity code for Sum example contract and its associated CFG
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Definition 3.2. Given a program P = {b0...bn}, we denote
J (P ) = {i | bi ≡ JUMPDEST}
as the set of all possible jump addresses. As P is a finite program, J (P ) is also finite
and well-defined.
This feature is really useful for analysis, as we can statically determine which values in
the stack are the ones that can determine an edge in a CFG. We can just ignore all those
values that we know for sure they cannot be a possible branch target. Thus, instead of
using a global definition of an abstract stack, it will be associated to a concrete program.
From this point, we will simply use J instead of using J (P ), unless it is not clear
which program the set is associated to.
Example 3.2. The set of possible jump addresses corresponding to contract in Figure 3.1
is
J = {73, A0, 11B, 127, 143, 169, 14B, 103, 159, 169, 166, 117, 92, 155, A9}
Note that all these directions correspond to the beginning of a block, but not all blocks
start with a JUMPDEST instruction. For example, block 131 starts with a push instruction.

EVM stacks have a unique feature that will make our analysis easier: it has a maximum
size of 1024 elements. This means we can assume the stack is flattened in those Solidity
programs without recursion. Each stack variable will be denoted as si, and we will use
V to represent the set of all possible stack variables. In our representation, if a stack has
size n, the variable stack sn−1 represents the top of the stack, sn−2 the following element
and so on.
Definition 3.3 (Abstract stack). An abstract stack is a pair 〈n, σ〉, where n is the number
of elements in the stack and σ : V 7→ J is a partial mapping that maps a variable stack
with its associated value in case it is a valid jump target.
Using a partial mapping instead of a total mapping has two advantages for our anal-
ysis:
• We have assumed previously that jump targets can only be obtained through a
PUSHx v instruction. Thus, by using this partial mapping, we can just ignore those
values we would have to define in case we were using a total mapping.
• It provides a simple representation for deciding whether two abstract stacks are the
same or not: two abstract stacks are equivalent iff they have the same size and also
share the same partial mapping. This way, we define an equivalence relation that
subsumes all stacks that are essentially the same for our analysis, not considering
values that aren’t taken into account in branch instructions.
We saw in Example 1.1 that we are dealing with set of stacks, instead of just stacks.
This will be our motivation for defining an abstract state, the structure we will be working
with in our analysis.
For that purpose, we define the set of all stack states S = {〈n, σ〉|0 ≤ n ≤ |V|∧σ(s) ∈
Σn}. Σn is the set of all mappings using n stack variables, defined recursively as follows:
Σi = Σi−1 ∪ {σ[si 7→ j] | σ ∈ Σi−1 ∧ j ∈ J }; Σ0 = {σ∅}, where σ∅ is the empty mapping.
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Definition 3.4 (Abstract state). Given a program P , we will denote abstract state as a
partial mapping pi of pairs of the form S 7→ P(S).
This definition may seem odd at first. Considering examples we have seen before,
using a set instead of a mapping would be probably the first option. In fact, a set is
sufficient for proposing an algorithm, but working with a partial map makes it easier to
formalize the generation of edges in the CFG. We will study it later in Section 4.3.
Once we have identified the elements we will be working with in our analysis, we are
going to introduce an ordering v between them that will be useful for developing the
theoretical basis.
The abstract domain is the lattice 〈AS , pi> , pi⊥ ,unionsq,v〉, where AS is the set of abstract
states and pi> is the top of the lattice defined as the mapping pi> , such that ∀s ∈ S, pi>(s) =
S. pi⊥(s) is defined as the empty abstract state.
The function img(pi, s) is defined as follows: pi(s) if s ∈ dom(pi), ∅ otherwise.
Given two abstract states pi1, pi2, we use pi = pi1 unionsq pi2 to denote the least upper bound,
which is an abstract state that satisfies ∀s ∈ dom(pi1) ∪ dom(pi2), pi(s) = img(pi1, s) ∪
img(pi2, s). Besides, pi1 v pi2 iff dom(pi1) ⊆ dom(pi2) and ∀s ∈ dom(pi1), pi1(s) ⊆ pi2(s).
In fact, it was sufficient to define abstract states as partial mappings of the form
S 7→ S, as each abstract stack will only point to another abstract stack in our analysis.
However, by using our definition, we characterize the abstract domain as a complete
lattice instead of a chain-complete ordered set.
With these notions of abstract stack, abstract state and abstract domain, we can
finally introduce the stack-based semantics we will be working with.
3.3.1 A simplified EVM semantic for analysis purposes
Given a program P = {b0, ..., bn}, we will denote the program state S as a pair of the
form 〈pc, s〉, where pc ∈ {0, ..., n} and s is an abstract stack. pc refers to the point of the
program we are currently in, and the abstract stack reflects a possible stack state before
executing instruction bpc.
The following notation is used to fully express the rules in our semantics. We refer to
positions in the stack with si, being the top of the stack sn−1. Given a partial mapping
σ, the expression σ[si 7→ y] indicates the map that shares the same values ∀sj 6= si as σ,
and σ(si) = y. We are also using σ\[si] for denoting the map that shares all the values
with σ for all sj 6= si and is undefined for si.
Figure 3.2 shows our proposed semantics for handling jumps. We will be using this
semantics throughout the analysis section, as it contains the needed information we need
to represent for developing our algorithm.
This semantics over-approximates the real EVM semantics. This can be seen with
rules (2) and (3), that can be both applied for the same opcode JUMPI: our semantics
is non-deterministic, as opposed to the real one. However, we will prove that this is the
only source of overestimation in the analysis.
From the rules of our semantics, it is clear that all of them focus on branch opcodes,
PUSHx v, SWAP x and DUP x. This is due to previous assumption that addresses are in-
troduced in the stack through PUSHx v instruction, and no arithmetic instructions can
manipulate them.
The rest of instructions just have an impact in the size of the abstract stack: this is
simulated with rule (12), where δ and α refers to the amount of elements of the stack
consumed and added to the stack respectively by executing that instruction. These values
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(1)
bpc = JUMP
〈pc, 〈n, σ〉〉 ⇒ 〈σ(sn−1), 〈n− 1, σ\[sn−1]〉〉
(2)
bpc = JUMPI
〈pc, 〈n, σ〉〉 ⇒ 〈σ(sn−1), 〈n−2, σ\[sn−1, sn−2]〉〉
(3)
bpc = JUMPI
〈pc, 〈n, σ〉〉 ⇒ 〈pc+size(bpc), 〈n−2, σ\[sn−1, sn−2]〉〉
(4)
bpc = PUSHx v, v ∈ J
〈pc, 〈n, σ〉〉 ⇒ 〈pc+size(bpc), 〈n+ 1, σ[sn 7→ v]〉〉
(5)
bpc = PUSHx v, v /∈ J
〈pc, 〈n, σ〉〉 ⇒ 〈pc+size(bpc), 〈n+ 1, σ〉〉
(6)
bpc = DUPx, sn−x ∈ dom(σ)
〈pc, 〈n, σ〉〉 ⇒ 〈pc+size(bpc), 〈n+ 1, σ[sn 7→ σ(sn−x)]〉〉
(7)
bpc = DUPx, sn−x /∈ dom(σ)
〈pc, 〈n, σ〉〉 ⇒ 〈pc+size(bpc), 〈n+ 1, σ〉〉
(8)
bpc = SWAPx, sn−1 ∈ dom(σ), sn−x−1 ∈ dom(σ)
〈pc, 〈n, σ〉〉 ⇒ 〈pc+size(bpc), 〈n, σ[sn−x−1 7→ σ(sn−1), sn−1 7→ σ(sn−x−1)]〉〉
(9)
bpc = SWAPx, sn−1 ∈ dom(σ), sn−x−1 /∈ dom(σ)
〈pc, 〈n, σ〉〉 ⇒ 〈pc+size(bpc), 〈n, σ[sn−x−1 7→ σ(sn−1)]\[sn−1]〉〉
(10)
bpc = SWAPx, sn−1 /∈ dom(σ), sn−x−1 ∈ dom(σ)
〈pc, 〈n, σ〉〉 ⇒ 〈pc+size(bpc), 〈n, σ[sn−1 7→ σ(sn−x−1)]\[sn−x−1]〉〉
(11)
bpc = SWAPx, sn−1 /∈ dom(σ), sn−x−1 /∈ dom(σ)
〈pc, 〈n, σ〉〉 ⇒ 〈pc+size(bpc), 〈n, σ〉〉
(12)
bδ,αpc ∈ otherwise, bδ,αpc /∈ End
〈pc, 〈n, σ〉〉 ⇒ 〈pc+size(bpc), 〈n−δ+α, σ\[sn−1, ..., sn−δ]〉〉
Figure 3.2: Simplified EVM semantics for handling jumps
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are specific of every opcode, and can be found in Ethereum Yellow Paper [8]. However,
this document contains too many details to understand easily which opcodes are available
and their related semantics. A summary of EVM bytecodes with a brief explanation of
their usage can be found in reference web [9].
We also use the function size defined previously for updating the value of the program
counter to the next bytecode which contains an instruction.
It is important to note that PUSHx v, SWAPx and DUPx rules are not single rules, but
rather a family of parametric rules that have a different effect depending on the value of
x.
Rules 1 to 3 refer to branch instructions. As we have discussed before, we can safely
assume that σ(sn−1) contains a valid target address. JUMP instruction just takes the top
stack value and changes the value of the program counter to that value, whereas JUMPI
takes two top values and should decide whether to jump or not depending on the second
one. As this second value is a boolean one, we cannot guarantee this is a known value,
and we simulate both possibilities by defining two different rules that can be applied.
Rules 4 and 5 include both cases for PUSHx instruction: the value we have pushed can
either be a jump target or not. In the first case we need to update the partial mapping,
whereas in the second it remains the same. Therefore, we need to define two different
rules for simulating both cases.
Same approach happens with rules 6-7 and 8-11. There are 4 rules that involve SWAP x
opcode, as we have two values changed at the same time and there are four possibilities
according to being a branch address or not.
Rule 12 summarizes the rest of possible opcodes, that have no real impact in the
values we store in the stack. Using the α and δ notation allows us to cover all the rules
that have no significant impact in the stack in just one rule.
A complete execution is a trace of the form S0 ⇒ S1 ⇒ . . . ⇒ Sn where S0 ≡
〈0, 〈0, σ∅〉〉 is the initial state, σ∅ is the empty mapping, and Sn corresponds to the final
state.
If we use the real semantics instead for defining a complete execution, there will no
infinite traces, as any transaction that executes EVM code has a finite gas limit and every
instruction executed consumes some amount of gas. When the gas limit is exceeded, an
out-of-gas exception occurs and the program halts immediately.
However, using our proposed semantics, there could be cases in which an infinite trace
would be obtained, as gas consumption isn’t considered for our semantics, assuming we
have ∞ gas available. In that situation, two different cases may occur:
• The same program state appears twice in the execution. This would lead to a cycle
appearing in our CFG, meaning that this trace is correctly represented in the graph.
However, even if we can generate infinite traces in our CFG using cycles, we know
that only finite paths correspond to possible flows, so no information is lost.
• The same program state doesn’t appear more than once in a trace. We already
know that this situation will be impossible with the real semantics even if we had∞
gas, as there is a finite number of possible program states due to stack restrictions.
Therefore, our analysis of that contract would fail, and the same that would happen
if we tried to invoke the corresponding transaction in Ethereum. An example of
this situation will be provided in Section 8.2.
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We conclude that our simplified semantics doesn’t lose nor include information for
being able to generate infinite traces.
Example 3.3. We are going to simulate a complete execution in our previous example.
Let’s assume we have a previous trace S0 ⇒ Sm, where Sm = 〈12D, 〈4, σ[s1 7→ A9]〉〉. This
program counter corresponds to instruction PUSH2 0x0143 in block 127. We have already
determined in Example 3.2 that 143 ∈ J , and we also know that size(PUSH2 0x0143)=3.
Therefore, by applying rule 4, we obtain that
Sm ⇒ 〈130, 〈5, σ[s4 7→ 143, s1 7→ A9]〉〉 := Sm+1
Now we have that b130 = JUMPI, we can either apply rule 2 or rule 3. In the first case,
we would obtain that
Sm+1 ⇒ 〈143, 〈3, σ[s1 7→ A9]〉〉
whereas in the second one
Sm+1 ⇒ 〈131, 〈3, σ[s1 7→ A9]〉〉
This way, we would generate all possible flows in our program. 
Chapter 4
Analysis
In order to define a concrete algorithm for obtaining a CFG, we need to introduce some
definitions that formalize the ideas mentioned in Section 1.2.
As we have mentioned before, in general, a block is a maximal sequence of straight-line
consecutive code in the program with the property that its execution always starts from
the first instruction, and it cannot halt or branch, except possibly at its last instruction.
This definition is adapted for an EVM program as follows:
Definition 4.1 (blocks). Given a EVM program P = {b0, . . . , bn}, we define
blocks(P ) =
{
Bi ≡ bi, . . . , bj
∣∣∣∣ (∀k.i < k < j, bk 6∈ Jump ∪ End ∪ {JUMPDEST}) ∧( i=1 ∨ bi≡JUMPDEST ∨ bi−1=JUMPI ) ∧
( j=n ∨ bj ∈ Jump ∨ bj ∈ End ∨ bj+1≡JUMPDEST )
}
where
Jump = {JUMP,JUMPI}
End = {REVERT, STOP, INVALID}
For EVM, it is also easy to determine blocks, mainly because JUMPDEST opcode always
identifies the target of a jump. However, other stack-based languages may not have this
feature, and therefore we need to identify blocks while performing the analysis.
Blocks in Figure 3.1 have been delimited using this definition.
4.1 The transfer function
In previous Section 3.3, we have already modeled how we are representing EVM structures.
Now we are introducing a function that describes the effect of each EVM opcode on that
representation, so that we can simulate how our stack evolves.
We define the updating function λ(bδ,α, s) as a function that given an EVM opcode
and an abstract stack s, returns the abstract stack corresponding to the execution of that
opcode on s. This function is defined using Figure 4.1.
The values of α and δ are again the same of the semantics defined in Section 3.3.1.
Clearly, transfer function is based on that semantics, and aims to formalize those ideas
into a function that can be translated into code. In fact, the following lemma holds:
Lemma 4.1. Let P = {b0, ..., bn} be an EVM program and s, s′ abstract stacks. For any
index i such as 0 ≤ i ≤ n and bi /∈ End, it exists a derivation for some other index
j such that 〈i, s〉 ⇒ 〈j, s′〉 iff λ(bi, s) = s′. In case bi ∈ Jump, we need the additional
requirement that σ(sn−1) is defined.
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bδ,α λ(b, 〈n, σ〉)
(1)
PUSH x
〈n+ 1, σ[sn 7→ x]〉 when x ∈ J
〈n+ 1, σ〉 when x 6∈ J
(2) DUP x
〈n+ 1, σ〉 when sn−x 6∈ dom(σ)
〈n+ 1, σ[sn 7→ σ(sn−x)]〉 when sn−x ∈ dom(σ)
(3) SWAP x
〈n, σ〉 when sn−1 6∈ dom(σ) ∧ sn−x−1 6∈ dom(σ)
〈n, σ[sn−x−1 7→ σ(sn−1), sn−1 7→ σ(sn−x−1)]〉 when sn−1 ∈ dom(σ) ∧ sn−x−1 ∈ dom(σ)
〈n, σ[sn−1 7→ σ(sn−x−1)]\[sn−x−1]〉 when sn−1 6∈ dom(σ) ∧ sn−x−1 ∈ dom(σ)
〈n, σ[sn−x−1 7→ σ(sn−1)]\[sn−1]〉 when sn−1 ∈ dom(σ) ∧ sn−x−1 6∈ dom(σ)
(4) otherwise 〈n− δ + α, σ\[sn−1, . . . , sn−δ]〉
Figure 4.1: Updating function
Proof. Straightforward by considering all possible opcodes bi might be and comparing
the result of applying its associated rule in the semantics with the transfer function.
Nevertheless, we are also interested in using the definition above for abstract states,
as we may have different stacks in the same program point. This is our motivation for
defining the transfer function:
Definition 4.2 (Transfer function). Given the set of abstract states AS and the set of
EVM instructions Ins, the transfer function τ is a function of the form:
τ : Ins× AS 7→ AS
defined as follows:
τ(b, pi) = pi′ where ∀s ∈ dom(pi), pi′(s) = λ(b, pi(s))
We will illustrate the idea with an example:
Example 4.1. Given the following initial abstract state {〈2, {}〉 7→ {〈2, {}〉}}, which
corresponds to the initial stack state for executing block 73, the application of the transfer
function τ to the block that starts at EVM instruction 73, produces the following results
(between parenthesis we show the program point). To the right we show the application
of the transfer function to block A0 with its initial abstract state {〈2, {}〉 7→ {〈2, {}〉}}.
(73) JUMPDEST {〈2, {}〉 7→ {〈2, {}〉}}
(74) POP {〈2, {}〉 7→ {〈1, {}〉}}
(75) PUSH2 092 {〈2, {}〉 7→ {〈2, {s1 7→ 92}〉}}
(78) PUSH1 04 {〈2, {}〉 7→ {〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉}}
(7A) DUP1 {〈2, {}〉 7→ {〈4, {s1 7→ 92}〉}}
(7B) CALLDATASIZE {〈2, {}〉 7→ {〈5, {s1 7→ 92}〉}}
(7C) SUB {〈2, {}〉 7→ {〈4, {s1 7→ 92}〉}}
(7D) DUP2 {〈2, {}〉 7→ {〈5, {s1 7→ 92}〉}}
(7E) ADD {〈2, {}〉 7→ {〈4, {s1 7→ 92}〉}}
.
..
(8D) POP {〈2, {}〉 7→ {〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉}}
(8E) PUSH2 0103 {〈2, {}〉 7→ {〈4, {s1 7→ 92, s3 7→ 103}〉}}
(91) JUMP {〈2, {}〉 7→ {〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉}}
(A0) JUMPDEST {〈2, {}〉 7→ {〈2, {}〉}}
(A1) POP {〈2, {}〉 7→ {〈1, {}〉}}
(A2) PUSH2 00a9 {〈2, {}〉 7→ {〈2, {s1 7→ A9}〉}}
(A5) PUSH1 011b {〈2, {}〉 7→ {〈3, {s2 7→ 11B, s1 7→ A9}〉}}
(A8) JUMP {〈2, {}〉 7→ {〈2, {s1 7→ A9}〉}}

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4.2 The constraint equation system
Now we have all the necessary definitions to define a proper algorithm to generate the
CFG.
Our first step is to obtain all the abstract states for each program point. As we will
see later, this is the critical part of the algorithm: once we have them, obtaining the
edges of the CFG and deciding how to clone the nodes becomes really easy.
This step is going to be achieved by defining a constraint equation system that once
solved obtains the abstract states:
Definition 4.3 (Addresses equation system). Given an EVM program P = {b0, ..., bn},
its addresses equation system E(P ) contains the following equations according to EVM
bytecode instructions bpc ∈ P :
bpc Cpc
(1) JUMP
Xσ(sn−1) w idmap(λ(bpc, 〈n, σ〉))
∀s ∈ dom(Xpc), 〈n, σ〉 ∈ Xpc(s)
(2) JUMPI
Xσ(sn−1) w idmap(λ(bpc, 〈n, σ〉))
Xpc+size(bpc) w idmap(λ(bpc, 〈n, σ〉))
∀s ∈ dom(Xpc), 〈n, σ〉 ∈ Xpc(s)
(3) bpc /∈ End ∧ bpc+size(bpc) = JUMPDEST Xpc+size(bpc) w idmap(λ(bpc, 〈n, σ〉))∀s ∈ dom(Xpc), 〈n, σ〉 ∈ Xpc(s)
(4) Otherwise, with bpc /∈ End Xpc+size(bpc) w τ(bi,Xi)
(5) Initial opcode b0 X0 w {〈0, σ∅〉 7→ {〈0, σ∅〉}}
Figure 4.2: Jumping address system equations
where idmap returns a map pi such that dom(pi) = {s} and pi(s) = {s}.
We add an equation for initializing the system: EVM has a unique entry point at
instruction b0, and at this point, the stack is empty. This way, we also prevent the empty
solution to be valid.
The constraint equations system has an equation for all program points of the pro-
gram; only terminal instructions don’t have. The main reason is that our constraint
equation system represents the flow of the program linking each program point to the
next one and End instructions have no following instruction.
Following this approach, it is easy to understand why we need to separate rules 1 to
3 from the others. Rule 1 represents an unconditional jump, so the equation links the
current set with the branch target. The same happens with rule 2, but in this case we
need to separate in two different equations, representing both the possibility of taking or
not the jump.
Rule 3 is different from the other two. In this case, the only difference with rule 4 is
the usage of function idmap.
So, why are we using idmap instead of the transfer function for rules 1-4? As we
have discussed before, the purpose of using partial maps instead of sets in abstract state
definition is to keep a relation between the abstract stack at the beginning of a block to
its evolution to the current program point. Equations 1-4 represent those instructions in
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which the next one is the beginning of another block. Thus, we need to reset the mapping.
In order to achieve so, we use the function idmap. For each abstract stack contained in
Xpc(s) for some abstract stack s, we generate a new abstract state that contains both
as key and value Xpc(s) and {Xpc(s)} respectively. This way, we ensure abstract states
associated to a block contain as keys the corresponding abstract stack at the beginning
of that block.
It is also important to remember that we are working under the assumption that
jump values are only obtained through PUSHx, DUPx and SWAPx instructions. For those
cases the address is obtained from a previously stored value, our reasoning cannot be
applied, as the abstract state before a jump instruction doesn’t contain a known value
for sn−1 and thus, no equation is generated. Therefore, we are losing accuracy, and the
analysis directly fails when trying to generate this new equation. Nevertheless, by using
system, our experiments report a success rate of 99%, meaning we can safely consider
this assumption.
We will show how equations are generated with an example:
Example 4.2. As it can be seen in Figure 3.1, we can jump to block 103 from two
different blocks: 73 and 14B. The computation of the jump equations system will produce
the following equations for the entry program points of these two blocks:
X73 w {〈2, {}〉 7→ {〈2, {}〉}}
...
X91 w {〈2, {}〉 7→ {〈4, {s1 7→ 92, s3 7→ 103}〉}}
X103 1© w {〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉 7→ {〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉}}
X14B w {〈4, {s1 7→ A9}〉 7→ {〈4, {s1 7→ A9}〉}}
...
X154 w {〈4, {s1 7→ A9}〉 7→ {〈7, {s6 7→ 103, s4 7→ 155, s1 7→ A9}〉}}
X103 2© w {〈6, {s4 7→ 155, s1 7→ A9}〉 7→ {〈6, {s4 7→ 155, s1 7→ A9}〉}}
Observe that we have two different stack contents reaching the same program point, i.e.
two equations for X64B are produced by two different blocks, the JUMP at the end of block
73, identified by X103 1©, and the JUMP at the end of block 14B, identified by X103 2©.
Thus, the equation that must hold for X103 is produced by the application of the operation
X103 1© unionsq X103 2©, as follows:
X103 w {〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉 7→ {〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉},
〈6, {s4 7→ 155, s1 7→ A9}〉 7→ {〈6, {s4 7→ 155, s1 7→ A9}〉}}
Note that the application of the transfer function τ for all instructions of block 103
applies function λ to all elements in the abstract state and updates it accordingly
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(JUMPDEST) X103 w {〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉 7→ {〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉},
〈6, {s4 7→ 155, s1 7→ A9}〉 7→ {〈6, {s4 7→ 155, s1 7→ A9}〉}}
(PUSH1 00) X104 w {〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉 7→ {〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉},
〈6, {s4 7→ 155, s1 7→ A9}〉 7→ {〈6, {s4 7→ 155, s1 7→ A9}〉}}
(PUSH1 0e) X106 w {〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉 7→ {〈4, {s1 7→ 92}〉},
〈6, {s4 7→ 155, s1 7→ A9}〉 7→ {〈7, {s4 7→ 155, s1 7→ A9}〉}}
(SWAP1) X108 w {〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉 7→ {〈5, {s1 7→ 92}〉},
〈6, {s4 7→ 155, s1 7→ A9}〉 7→ {〈8, {s4 7→ 155, s1 7→ A9}〉}}
(POP) X109 w {〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉 7→ {〈5, {s1 7→ 92}〉},
〈6, {s4 7→ 155, s1 7→ A9}〉 7→ {〈8, {s4 7→ 155, s1 7→ A9}〉}}

We will prove in Chapter 6 that the constraint variables in a solution of the system
overestimate the jumping information of the program.
Previous equation system can also be seen as an operator, which given a set of abstract
states, propagates the abstract states in these sets following the equations above. It can
be proven that E(P ) is a monotone function according to the partial order defined in
Section 3.3 . The least solution corresponds to the least fixed point of this operator.
This approach gives us a naive algorithm, which consists in initializing all the con-
straints variables to the empty mapping pi⊥ except for X0, which is initialized to {〈0, σ∅〉 7→
{〈0, σ∅〉} in order to satisfy directly last equation from the jump equation system. Then
the values of these variables are iteratively updated following the equations until the least
fixed point is reached:
1. Substitute the current values of the constraint variables in the right-hand side of
each constraint, and then evaluate the right-hand side if needed;
2. If each constraint X w E holds, where E is the value of the evaluation of the
right-hand side of the previous step then the process finishes
3. Otherwise, for each X w E which does not hold, let E ′ be the current value of X .
Then update the current value of X to E unionsqE ′. Once all these updates are applied,
repeat step 1.
Termination is guaranteed since the abstract domain is finite, as there is a finite
number of jump target addresses and the stack size is finite.
The reason why we are interested in solving this system is explicitly stated in next
theorem:
Theorem 4.1 (Soundness). Let P ≡ b0, . . . , bp be a program, X1, . . . ,Xn the solution of
the jumps equations system of P , and pc the program counter of a jump instruction. Then
for any execution of P , there exists s ∈ dom(Xpc) such that 〈n, σ〉 ∈ Xpc(s) and σ(sn−1)
contains all jump addresses that instruction bpc might jump to during the execution of P .
As we will prove later, a stronger result can be derived from this equation system.
Nevertheless, we are only interested in how jumps are performed to generate the CFG.
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Example 4.3. Let’s analyze how to apply this algorithm with our example. At first,
we initialize all our equation sets to the empty set, except for X0, that we have already
initialized using the equation
X00 w {〈0, σ∅〉 7→ {〈0, σ∅〉}}
Hundreds of equations have been generated from our example, so it is not feasible
discussing the whole scheme. Instead, we will analyze how X103 evolves through different
iterations.
For that purpose, we will denote Xni as the contents of set Xn in iteration i. This
notation will be further used to prove completeness in Chapter 6.
First time an equation involving X103 in the left size appears is in iteration 55, as
b91 = JUMP, X9153 = pi⊥ and X9154 = {〈2, {}〉 7→ {〈4, {s1 7→ 92, s3 7→ 103}〉}}.
Thus, a new equation is generated
X103 w idmap(λ(JUMP, 〈4, {s1 7→ 92, s3 7→ 103}〉))
or equivalently,
X103 w idmap(〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉)
Then, it is followed that X10355 = {〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉 7→ {〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉}}. This value is
propagated in the following iteration of the algorithm, obtaining X10456 = {〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉 7→
{〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉}} and so on.
This value remains unchanged until iteration 99, as we have obtained in the previous
iteration that X15498 = {〈4, {s1 7→ A9}〉 7→ {〈7, {s6 7→ 103, s4 7→ 155, s1 7→ A9}〉}}.
b154 = JUMP, so we can apply equation (1) from our jump addresses system
X103 w idmap(λ(JUMP, 〈7, {s6 7→ 103, s4 7→ 155, s1 7→ A9}〉}))
By evaluating this equation and previous one, it is followed that
X103 w {〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉 7→ {〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉},
〈6, {s4 7→ 155, s1 7→ A9}〉 7→ {〈6, {s4 7→ 155, s1 7→ A9}〉}}
X103 is never evaluated again. This means we have reached a fixed point with X103 and
X103 = X10399.
We can extend this reasoning with each of the equations in our system.
This example may seem trivial at first sight, but the idea of how the algorithm works
will prove useful for later proofs. Every abstract state we obtain comes from evaluating a
previous abstract state from another solution set. Thus, each abstract state in a solution
can be traced back to the iteration it appeared.

4.3 Control Flow Graph
Once we have obtained the solution to the equation system, we can now generate the
control flow graph of a program.
We define the function getId(i, 〈n, σ〉) that given the block identifier i and an abstract
stack 〈n, σ〉 returns a unique identifier for the abstract stack 〈n, σ〉 ∈ dom(Xi).
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Example 4.4. Given the equation:
X103 w {〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
1
7→ {〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉}, 〈6, {s4 7→ 155, s1 7→ A9}〉︸ ︷︷ ︸
2
7→ {〈6, {s4 7→ 155, s1 7→ A9}〉}}
we have that getId(103, 〈3, {s1 7→ 92}〉) = 1 and getId(103, 〈6, {s4 7→ 155, s1 7→ A9}〉) =
2. 
Finally, we can define what our CFG is and how it is obtained:
Definition 4.4. Given an EVM program P , its blocks Bi ≡ bi...bj ∈ blocks(P ) and the
least solution of the jumps equations system Xpc for all pc ∈ P , we define the control flow
graph CFG = 〈V,E〉, where
V = {Bi:id | Bi ∈ blocks(P ) ∧ 〈n, σ〉 ∈ dom(Xi) ∧ id = getId(i, 〈n, σ〉)}
and a set of edges E = Ejump ∪ Enext such that:
Ejump = {Bi:id → Bd:id2 | bj ∈ Jump ∧
〈n, σ〉 ∈ dom(Xj) ∧ id = getId(i, 〈n, σ〉) ∧
〈n′, σ′〉 ∈ Xj(〈n, σ〉) ∧ d = σ′(sn′−1) ∧
〈n′′, σ′′〉 = λ(bj, 〈n′, σ′〉) ∧ id2 = getId(d, 〈n′′, σ′′〉) }
Enext = {Bi:id → Bd:id2 | bj 6= JUMP ∧ bj 6∈ End ∧
〈n, σ〉 ∈ dom(Xj) ∧ id = getId(i, 〈n, σ〉) ∧
〈n′, σ′〉 ∈ Xj(〈n, σ〉) ∧ d = j + size(bj) ∧
〈n′′, σ′′〉 = λ(bj, 〈n′, σ′〉) ∧ id2 = getId(d, 〈n′′, σ′′〉)
Each vertex of the CFG corresponds to the combination of a block initial address and
an associated stack at the beginning of that block. This way, we guarantee that execution
through that node produces a unique final stack, which means there is no way unfeasible
paths are introduced in our CFG. It also means that each vertex points to another node,
unless last instruction is JUMPI. In that case, it will point to two different nodes: one edge
will belong to Ejump and the other to Enext. However, nodes can be pointed by multiple
vertex if they share their final abstract stack.
We make an explicit difference between edges: those produced by Jump instructions,
whose destination block is obtained from the values store before the jump with d =
σ′(sn′−1); and those whose destination block is computed with d = j + size(bj). In
both cases, we join two nodes if the abstract stack associated to the first instruction of
the second node corresponds to applying λ to the abstract stack associated to the last
instruction in the first node.
Example 4.5. Considering the blocks shown in Figure 3.1 and the equations shown at
Figure 4.2, the CFG of the program includes non-replicated nodes for those blocks that only
receive one possible stack state (white nodes in Figure 3.1). We will omit the subindex in
these cases. However, the nodes that could be reached by two different stack states (gray
nodes in Figure 3.1) will be replicated in the CFG:
V = {B73, BA0, B11B, B127, B131, B143, B14B, B92, BA9,
B103:1, B159:1, B169:1, B166:1, B117:1, B115:1,
B103:2, B159:2, B169:2, B166:2, B117:2, B115:2}
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Analogously, our CFG replicates the edges according to the nodes replicated (solid and
dashed edges in Figure 3.1):
E = {B73 → B103:1, B103:1 → B159:1, B159:1 → B169:1, B169:1 → B166:1, B166:1 → B117:1,
B117:1 → B92, BA0 99K B11B, B11B 99K B127, B127 99K B131, B131 99K B127,
B127 99K B143, B143 99K B169:2, B169:2 99K B14B, B14B 99K B103:2, B103:2 99K B159:2,
B159:2 99K B169:2, B169:2 99K B166:2, B166:2 99K B117:2, B117:2 99K B155:2, B155:2 99K BA9}
Note that obtained CFG is a subgraph of the one in Figure 1.2. We are using hexadecimal
notation instead, and the numeration of the blocks doesn’t match with the one from our
analysis: we start using subindexes after a block has been considered at least once before,
and numeration starts from 0 instead of 1.

Chapter 5
Soundness
The proof sketch follows the next steps:
1. We first define an EVM operational semantics that describes how EVM programs
handle jump addresses on the stack. This step was already made in Section 3.3.1.
2. Then we define an EVM collecting semantics for the operational semantics. Such
collecting semantics gathers all transitions that can be produced by the execution
of a program P ;
3. We continue by defining the jumps-to property as a property of this collecting
semantics; and
4. Then we prove a lemma that states that the least solution of the set of constraints
generated as described in Section 4.2 is a safe approximation of the EVM collecting
semantics w.r.t. the jumps-to property.
5. Finally, we rewrite Theorem 4.1 in terms of the operational semantics and prove it.
Definition 5.1 (EVM collecting semantics). Given an EVM program P and a set of pairs
of program states X, the EVM collecting semantics operator CP is defined as follows:
CP (X) = {〈S, S ′〉 | 〈 , S〉 ∈ X ∧ S ⇒ S ′}
The EVM semantics is defined as ξP =
⋃
n>0 CnP (X0), where X0 ≡ {〈∅, 〈0, 〈0, σ∅〉〉〉} is
the initial configuration.
Definition 5.2 (jumps-to property). Let P be an IR program, ξP =
⋃
n>0 CnP (X0), and b
an instruction at program point pc, then we say that ξP pc T if
T = {〈n, σ〉 | 〈S, S ′〉 ∈ ξP ∧ 〈pc, 〈n, σ〉〉 := S ′}
The following lemma states that the least solution of the constraint equation system
defined in Definition 4.3 is a safe approximation of ξP :
Lemma 5.1 (soundness). Let P ≡ b0, . . . , bp be a program, pc a program point and
X0, . . . ,Xp the least solution of the constraint equation system as defined in Section 4.2.
The following holds:
If ξP pc T , then for all 〈n, σ〉 ∈ T , exists s ∈ dom(Xpc) such that 〈n, σ〉 ∈ Xpc(s).
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Proof. We use Xmpc to refer to the value obtained for Xpc after m iterations of the algorithm
for solving the equation system depicted in Section 4.2. We say that Xpc covers 〈n, σ〉 in
CmP (X0) at program point pc when this lemma holds for the result of computing CmP (X0).
In order to prove this lemma, we can reason by induction on the value of m, the length
of the traces S0 ⇒m Sm considered in CmP (X0).
Case base: if m = 0, S0 = 〈0, 〈0, σ∅〉〉 and the Lemma trivially holds as 〈0, σ∅〉 ∈
X 00 (〈0, σ∅〉).
Induction Hypothesis: we assume Lemma 5.1 holds for all traces of length m ≥ 0.
Inductive Case: Let us consider traces of length m + 1, which are of the form
S0 ⇒m Sm ⇒ Sm+1. Sm is a program state of the form Sm = 〈pc, 〈n, σ〉〉. We can apply
the induction hypothesis to Sm: there exists some s ∈ dom(Xmpc ) such that 〈n, σ〉 ∈ Xmpc (s).
For extending the Lemma, we reason for all possible rules in the simplified EVM semantics
(Fig. 3.2) we may apply from Sm to Sm+1:
• Rule (1): After executing a JUMP instruction Sm+1 is of the form 〈σ(sn−1), 〈n −
1, σ\[sn−1]〉〉. In iteration m+ 1, the following set of equations corresponding to bpc
is evaluated:
Xσ(sn−1) w idmap(λ(bpc, 〈n′, σ′〉)) for all s′ ∈ dom(Xpc), 〈n′, σ′〉 ∈ Xpc(s′)
where idmap(λ(bpc, 〈n′, σ′〉)) = pi⊥[〈n′ − 1, σ′\[sn−1]〉 7→ {〈n′ − 1, σ′\[sn−1]〉}] (Case
(4) in Fig. 4.1). The induction hypothesis guarantees that there exists some s′′ ∈
Xmpc such that 〈n, σ〉 ∈ Xmpc (s′′), where Sm = 〈pc, 〈n, σ〉〉. Therefore, at Iteration
m+ 1, the following must hold:
Xm+1σ(sn−1) w pi⊥[〈n− 1, σ\[sn−1]〉 7→ {〈n− 1, σ\[sn−1]〉}]
so 〈n− 1, σ\[sn−1]〉 ∈ Xm+1σ(sn−1)(〈n− 1, σ\[sn−1]〉) and thus Lemma 5.1 holds.
• Rules (2) and (3): After executing a JUMPI instruction, Sm+1 is either 〈σ(sn−1), 〈n−
2, σ\[sn−1, sn−2]〉〉 or 〈pc+ size(bpc), 〈n− 2, σ\[sn−1, sn−2]〉〉, respectively. In any of
those cases the following sets of equations are evaluated:
Xσ(sn−2) w idmap(λ(JUMPI, 〈n′, σ′〉)) for all s′ ∈ dom(Xpc), 〈n′, σ′〉 ∈ Xpc(s′)
Xpc+1 w idmap(λ(JUMPI, 〈n′, σ′〉)) for all s′ ∈ dom(Xpc), 〈n′, σ′〉 ∈ Xpc(s′)
where idmap(λ(bpc, 〈n′, σ′〉)) = pi⊥[〈n′−2, σ′\[sn−1, sn−2]〉 7→ {〈n′ − 2, σ′\[sn−1, sn−2]〉}]
(Case (4) of the definition of the update function λ in Fig. 4.1). As in the previous
case, the induction hypothesis guarantees that at Iteration m there exists s′′ ∈ Xmpc
such that 〈n, σ〉 ∈ Xmpc (s′′). Therefore, in Iteration m+ 1, the following must hold:
Xm+1σ(sn−1) w pi⊥[〈n− 2, σ\[sn−1, sn−2]〉 7→ {〈n− 2, σ\[sn−1, sn−2]〉}]
Xm+1pc+1 w pi⊥[〈n− 2, σ\[sn−1, sn−2]〉 7→ {〈n− 2, σ\[sn−1, sn−2]〉}]
and thus Lemma 5.1 holds for these cases as well.
• Rules (4) - (12): We will first consider the case in which any of these rules corre-
sponds to an EVM instruction followed by an instruction different from JUMPDEST.
All rules are similar, as they all use the set of equations generated by Case (4) in
Definition 4.3. We will see Rule (4) in detail.
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After executing a PUSHx v instruction, Sm+1 is 〈pc + size(bpc), 〈n + 1, σ[sn 7→ v]〉〉.
We have to prove that exists some s ∈ dom(Xpc+size(bpc)) such that 〈n + 1, σ[sn 7→
v]〉 ∈ Xpc+size(bpc)(s). The following set of equations is evaluated:
Xpc+size(bpc) w τ(PUSHx,Xpc) (5.1)
By Definition 4.2, τ(PUSHx,Xpc) = pi′, where ∀s′ ∈ dom(pi), pi′(s′) = λ(PUSHx,Xpc(s′)).
By the case (1) of the definition of the update function λ, we have that:
∀〈n′′, σ′′〉 ∈ dom(Xpc), pi′(〈n′′, σ′′〉) = 〈n′′ + 1, σ′′[sn 7→ v]〉 (5.2)
By the induction hypothesis, at Iteration m there exists some s ∈ dom(Xmpc ) such
that 〈n, σ〉 ∈ Xmpc (s). Therefore, by 5.1 and 5.2, at Iteration m+ 1 we have that the
following holds:
s ∈ dom(Xm+1pc+size(bpc)) and 〈n+ 1, σ[sn 7→ v]〉 ∈ Xpc+size(bpc)(s)
and thus Lemma 5.1 holds for Rule (4).
• Rules (4) - (12), followed by a JUMPDEST instruction. After executing any of these
instructions, Sm+1 is 〈pc + size(bpc), 〈n′′′, σ′′′〉〉, where 〈n′′′, σ′′′〉 is obtained ac-
cording to the rule from Figure 3.2. We have to prove that there exists some
s ∈ dom(Xpc+size(bpc)) such that 〈n′′′, σ′′′〉 ∈ Xpc+size(bpc)(s). The following set of
equations is evaluated:
Xpc+size(bpc) w idmap(λ(bpc, 〈n′, σ′〉)) for all s′ ∈ dom(Xpc), 〈n′, σ′〉 ∈ Xpc(s′)
(5.3)
where idmap(λ(bpc, 〈n′, σ′〉)) = pi⊥[〈n′′, σ′′]〉 7→ {〈n′′, σ′′〉}], where n′′ and σ′′ are
obtained according to the cases of the updating function detailed in Figure 4.1.
Using Lemma 4.1, we can see that s = 〈n′′, σ′′〉 matches the modification made to
the state Sm+1 by the corresponding rule of the semantics. Therefore, at Iteration
it holds that s ∈ Xm+1pc+size(bpc)(s), and Lemma 5.1 also holds.
When the algorithm stops Lemma 5.1 holds, as for any pc, Xm+1pc w Xmpc for each
iteration of the algorithm for solving the equations system of Section 4.2.
Now we rewrite Theorem 4.1 in terms of the operational semantics of Figure 3.2. This
rewriting actually is stronger than Theorem 4.1, as it guarantees the correctness of the
stack states obtained from the jumps equations system at any step of the execution.
Theorem 5.1 (Soundness). Let P ≡ b0, . . . , bp be a program, S0 = 〈0, 〈0, σ∅〉〉 the initial
program state, and X1, . . . ,Xn the solution of the jumps equations system of P . Then
for any trace S0 ⇒∗ Sm, where Sm = 〈pc, 〈n, σ〉〉, there exists s ∈ dom(Xpc) such that
〈n, σ〉 ∈ Xpc(s).
Proof. Straightforward from Lemma 5.1, as the EVM collecting semantics takes into ac-
count all possible traces of the operational semantics.

Chapter 6
Completeness
In this Section, we are going to prove our algorithm is also complete according to the
semantics shown in Fig 3.2. The proof follows these steps:
1. First, we need to prove that every abstract state in each set of the least solution of
the jump equation system has been obtained in a finite iteration of the algorithm
m from evaluating an abstract state that appeared in the iteration m− 1.
2. Then we prove that for every value obtained in an iteration m of the algorithm,
it exists an m-trace whose final state corresponds to that value and its program
counter matches the set index.
3. Finally, we reason that necessarily each value has a finite trace associated, and
therefore, all abstract stacks in program states of our collecting semantics w.r.t
jumps-to property are contained in a solution.
The first step allows us to have a direct connection between the length of a trace using
our semantics and the iteration in which a value appeared using our algorithm. Using
this fact and induction reasoning, we will finally obtain the desired results.
Lemma 6.1. Let P = {b0, ..., bn} be a program and XCFG = {X0, ...,Xn} the least solution
of the constraint equation system defined in Section 4.2 . Let s be an abstract stack which
satisfies that s ∈ Xi(s′) for some abstract stack s′ and some index i. Then, the following
holds:
(1) It exists an index m such that
s ∈
{
Xmi (s′)\img(Xm−1i , s′) if m > 0
X 0i (s′) if m = 0
.
(2) If m > 0, it exits another abstract stack s′′ ∈ Xj(s′′′) for some abstract stack s′′′ and
index j, that verifies
s′′ ∈
{
Xm−1j (s′′′)\img(Xm−2j , s′′′) if m > 1
X 0j (s′′′) if m = 1
and λ(bj, s
′′) = s.
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Proof. (1) In each iteration of our algorithm, we evaluate all the equations in our jump
equation system, obtaining all the abstract states that had appeared in previous
iterations. Then Xmi w Xm−1i ∀m > 0. A fixed point is reached in a finite number
of iterations, thus it exists an index q which verifies that ∀r > q, Xi = X ri .
This means that s′ ∈ dom(X qi ) and s ∈ X qi (s′). As we have a finite chain X 0i v
X 1i v ... v X qi , necessarily one of the these two statements hold:
(a) s ∈ X 0i (s′).
(b) s ∈ X ji (s′) for some 0 < j ≤ q, but s /∈ img(X j−1i , s′).
If neither (a) nor (b) holds, then s ∈ X qi (s′) implies that s ∈ img(X q−1i , s′), as (b)
doesn’t hold. img(X q−1i , s′) cannot be empty, so it is followed that s′ ∈ dom(X q−1i ).
We are in the same situation as before, but we have decreased the index q. So we
can repeat the same reasoning decreasing the index each step, until we eventually
reach 0. We have proven that s ∈ img(X 0i (s′), s′) = X 0i (s′), which means that (a)
holds. Obviously, we have reached a contradiction.
The lemma is easily followed by setting m = 0 if (a) holds or m = j if (b) holds.
(2) As we have proven in (1), let s ∈ Xmi (s′)\img(Xm−1i , s′). This mapping has been
obtained from an equation of the form Xi w τ(Xj, bj) or Xi w idmap(λ(bj, 〈n, σ〉))
with 〈n, σ〉 ∈ Xj(〈n′, σ′〉), for some j. In both cases, it exists at least one abstract
stack s′′ such that s′′ ∈ Xj(s′′′), for some s′′′ ∈ dom(Xj), and λ(bj, s′′) = s. Note
that several abstract states may satisfy the condition, if they belong to different
equations in the constraint equation system. We are going to prove that at least
one of them satisfies (2).
As we have proven in (1), it exists an index k such that
s′′ ∈
{
X ki (s′′′)\img(X k−1i , s′′′) if k > 0
X 0i (s′′′), if k = 0
If we assume that k < m− 1, by evaluating the corresponding equation, we obtain
that s ∈ X k+1i (s′). However, as k+ 1 ≤ m− 1, we already know that Xm−1i w X k+1i
and therefore, s ∈ Xm−1i (s′) or equivalently, s ∈ img(Xm−1i , s′) . We have reached
a contradiction.
Now, let us assume that ∀s′′ which satisfies the condition, the associated index k is
greater than m− 1. Choosing t as the minimum between all of them, first time the
equation for obtaining s is evaluated is the iteration t+1. Therefore, s /∈ img(X ti , s′),
and this implies that s /∈ img(Xmi , s′), as t ≥ m and img(X ti , s′) w img(Xmi , s′).
Again, this means s /∈ Xmi (s′) and we have reached a contradiction.
From the two previous paragraphs, it is followed that at least one state s′′ has an
associated index m− 1 ≥ k and m− 1 ≤ k, or equivalently, k = m− 1.
In the Lemma above, img(Xm−1i , s) have been used instead of just Xm−1i (s), because
we cannot guarantee that s ∈ dom(Xm−1i ), and therefore, Xm−1i (s) could be not well-
defined.
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Lemma 6.2. Let P = {b0, ..., bn} be a program, S0 = 〈0, 〈0, σ∅〉〉 the initial program state,
an index i which verifies 0 ≤ i ≤ n, and 〈n, σ〉 an abstract stack that verifies it exists
some abstract stack s
〈n, σ〉 ∈
{
Xmi (s)\img(Xm−1i , s) if m > 0
X 0i (s), if m = 0
.
Then, there exists a trace S0 ⇒m Sm, where Sm = 〈i, 〈n, σ〉〉.
Proof. In order to prove this theorem, we reason by induction on the value of m, the first
iteration in which 〈n, σ〉 appears in Xi(s).
Case base: if m = 0, then the only abstract stack that belongs to an equation is
〈0, σ∅〉, which belongs to X0(〈0, σ∅〉). Therefore, as 〈0, 〈0, σ∅〉〉 = S0 and S0 ⇒0 S0, the
Lemma 6.2 trivially holds.
Induction Hypothesis: we assume that for all abstract stacks 〈n, σ〉 ∈ Xmi \img(Xm−1i , s)
, ∀i, 0 ≤ i ≤ n, it exists a trace S0 ⇒m Sm, where Sm = 〈i, 〈n, σ〉〉.
Inductive Case: let us consider an abstract stack of the form 〈n′, σ′〉 ∈ Xm+1j (s′)\img(Xmj , s′)
for another abstract stack s′. In Lemma 6.1, it was proven that it exists an index
i and the abstract stacks s and 〈n, σ〉, such that 〈n, σ〉 ∈ Xmi (s)\img(Xm−1i , s) and
λ(bi, 〈n, σ〉) = 〈n′, σ′〉. Then, we can apply the induction hypothesis to 〈n, σ〉, so it exists
a trace S0 ⇒m Sm, where Sm = 〈i, 〈n, σ〉〉. Now we reason for all possible opcodes bi may
be:
• bi = JUMP: in this case, from evaluating λ(bi, 〈n, σ〉), we deduce that 〈n′, σ′〉 =
〈n− 1, σ\[sn−1]〉. Besides, we know that the equation associated to bi is
Xσ(sn−1) w idmap(λ(bi, 〈n, σ〉)) ∀s ∈ dom(Xi), 〈n, σ〉 ∈ Xi(s)
so by evaluating 〈n, σ〉 in this equation, it follows that σ(sn−1) = j.
As bi = JUMP, by applying rule (1) in Fig. 3.2, we obtain that 〈i, 〈n, σ〉〉 ⇒
〈σ(sn−1), 〈n− 1, σ\[sn−1]〉〉. Our previous reasoning has shown that 〈σ(sn−1), 〈n−
1, σ\[sn−1]〉〉 = 〈j, 〈n′, σ′〉〉. So by applying the induction hypothesis, we have found
a (m+ 1)-trace of the form S0 ⇒m+1 Sm+1, where Sm+1 = 〈j, 〈n′, σ′〉〉.
• bi = JUMPI: in this case, from applying λ(bi, 〈n, σ〉), we obtain that 〈n′, σ′〉 =
〈n − 2, σ′\[sn−1, sn−2]〉. In this case, there are two equations associated to bi,
so we don’t know which one of the two has been used to obtain that 〈n′, σ′〉 ∈
Xm+1j (s′)\img(Xmj , s′). We will study both possibilities:
Let’s assume 〈n, σ〉 has been evaluated in
Xσ(sn−1) w idmap(λ(bi, 〈n, σ〉)) ∀s ∈ dom(Xi), 〈n, σ〉 ∈ Xi(s)
in order to obtain that 〈n′, σ′〉 ∈ Xm+1j (s′) for some s′. Then, Xm+1σ(sn−1) = Xm+1j and
this implies that necessarily j = σ(sn−1).
On the other hand, if we apply rule(2) in Fig. 3.2, it follows that 〈i, 〈n, σ〉〉 ⇒
〈σ(sn−1), 〈n − 2, σ\[sn−1, sn−2]〉〉. Therefore, Sm ⇒ 〈j, 〈n′, σ′〉〉 := Sm+1. By ap-
plying the induction hypothesis, we have generated (m + 1)-trace of the form
S0 ⇒m+1 Sm+1.
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If we assume that 〈n, σ〉 has been evaluated in
Xpc+size(bi) w idmap(λ(bi, 〈n, σ〉)) ∀s ∈ dom(Xi), 〈n, σ〉 ∈ Xi(s)
then necessarily j = i+ size(bi). The reasoning from this point is analogous to the
one before, as rule (2) and (3) only differ in the value of the program counter index.
• bi /∈ Jump ∪ End:
In this case, we could have applied either the equation
Xi+size(bi) w idmap(λ(bi, 〈n, σ〉)) ∀s ∈ dom(Xi), 〈n, σ〉 ∈ Xi(s)
or the equation
Xi+size(bi) w τ(bi,Xi)
In both cases, it follows that necessarily j = i+ size(bi).
Now we are going to use the Lemma 4.1, knowing that from the equations above,
necessarily λ(bi, 〈n, σ〉) = 〈n′, σ′〉. Therefore, 〈i, 〈n, σ〉〉 ⇒ 〈i + size(bi), 〈n′, σ′〉〉 =
〈j, 〈n′, σ′〉〉 := Sm+1. By applying the induction hypothesis, we obtain that S0 ⇒m+1
Sm+1.
The only cases left are the ones corresponding to bi ∈ End. However, it is impossible
that bi ∈ End: we have assumed there is an equation of the form Xj w f(Xi), but if we
study all the possible cases in Fig. 4.2, it is easily proven that there is no the equation
for such bi, and therefore, 〈n′, σ′〉 couldn’t have been generated.
It has been proved that every possible 〈n′, σ′〉 satisfies that there is a (m + 1)-trace.
Therefore, Lemma 6.2 is followed.
From the two previous Lemmas, it can easily be deduced that the constraint equation
system is complete, according to our semantics.
Theorem 6.1 (Completeness). Let P = {b0, ..., bn} be a program, S0 = 〈0, 〈0, σ∅〉〉 and
XCFG = {X0, ...,Xn} the least solution for the constraint equation system defined in Sec-
tion 4.2. For every abstract stack s ∈ XCFGi(s′) for some s′, it exists a trace S0 ⇒m Sm,
where Sm = 〈i, s〉 and m ≥ 0.
Proof. From Lemma 6.1, we know there exists an index m which verifies that
s ∈
{
Xmi (s′)\img(Xm−1i , s′) if m > 0
X 0i (s′), if m = 0
Therefore, by using Lemma 6.2, it is followed that S0 ⇒m Sm.
Completeness is guaranteed, however, this result only applies to the semantics we
have defined in Figure 3.2. We already know this semantics over-approximates the real
one, thus introducing some traces that cannot be generated in a real execution. However,
this is our only of overestimation, thus it is also our only source of losing completeness.
Therefore, only paths containing conditional branches in our CFG could correspond to
non-real executions in our program, just in case one of the conditions would always
evaluate to True or False.
Chapter 7
Implementation
The proposed algorithm has been included in EthIR tool, as we have already discussed.
EthIR obtains a RBR representation from the generated CFG and this representation
can be later used to infer properties of the EVM bytecode. Gastap uses this representa-
tion and infers gas upper bounds. Therefore, in order to assess the impact of our analysis,
we will make our experiments using Gastap.
Therefore, we will first present a general overview of Gastap tool in Section 7.1,
discussing how each component of its architecture works in order to infer upper bounds.
In Section 7.2, implementation details of the analysis discussed in this thesis will be
provided. Besides, we are going to discuss the results obtained from the code in Figure 7.3
using Gastap, in order to understand how the Gastap output works.
7.1 Gastap architecture
Oyente*   CFG EthIR* SA
C
O
 SR
Gas
Equation
GeneratorGE
PUBS  
Smart
Contract
Gas
Bounds
Opcode 
Gas 
Cost
Memory 
Gas 
Cost
RBR
Figure 7.1: Gastap Architecture
In Figure 7.1, the whole Gastap architecture is depicted. This picture shows all
intermediate representations obtained through the process. At each step, the output
generated from a previous tool and is used as an input for the next one in the flow
diagram.
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The CFG generator has been implemented on top of the Oyente tool [4]. The aim
of Oyente is to find security vulnerabilities and bugs in smart contracts rather than
building a CFG of the contract. Hence, the CFG generated by Oyente is not complete
and its approach is not sound. Thus, we only use the parser of Oyente, and we have
extended it to develop Oyente*. More details of the implementation will be given in
Section 7.2.
The EthIR decompiler [1] implements the generation of the high-level rule-based
representation given a complete CFG of the contract under analysis. For that purpose,
each block is translated into a function that receives as parameters stack variables, the
memory, the storage and the blockchain data. As we know the size of the stack at the
beginning of the block, we present the stack as independent stack variables that we pass
onto the function. Inside every function, each bytecode is translated into a high-level
rule, using the information we have already gathered from the stack. Finally, an explicit
call to the following function is included. This RBR representation is later modified to
allow dynamically computing the gas consumption.
Saco [10] is used to generate the cost equations and the size relations needed to
obtain the opcode gas upper-bound as well as to apply the peak resource analysis used to
infer the memory gas upper-bound.
EVM gas model is highly complex, so we have divided the gas consumption of each
instruction into two parts: memory gas upper-bound and opcode gas upper-bound. But
before understanding the reason behind this distinction, we are going to first understand
how cost analysis works.
Cost analysis is a type of static analysis which aims to measure the consumption
of a certain resource in a system and give it as a function on the size of the input
parameters. Normally, resources are cumulative, which means that are only increased
through execution, and its upper bound corresponds to the cost related to final state.
For instance, the number of calls in an execution is a cumulative resource. Cost analysis
has been broadly studied, and different generic frameworks based on different approaches
have been developed as a result.
However, there are other resources that are acquired and released during the execution.
They are known as non-cumulative resources. Reasoning about non-cumulative resources
raises new challenges: the resource consumption upper bound cannot be deduced from
the final state of the system, as it could happen on any intermediate step of the execution.
For instance, the maximum size a queue can have during an execution.
This cost is known as peak cost, and its analysis is known as peak cost analysis. A
generic framework for performing this analysis can be found in [11].
We would expect gas consumption to be a cumulative resource, as it clearly increases
for each instruction that is executed. This statement is partially true, because there
exists some instructions whose gas consumption depends on non-cumulative resources.
In order to infer a valid upper bound for gas, we need to make a distinction between the
memory gas cost and the opcode gas cost.
The memory gas cost refers to the cost associated to access locations in memory
that are beyond previously accessed locations. If an opcode makes such access, then its
gas consumption is proportional to the distance to this location. Memory is constantly
expanded and reduced through execution, and therefore, we have to perform the peak
cost analysis to infer valid upper bounds.
The opcode gas cost refers to the gas consumption when memory is not taken into
account. In this case, we don’t deal with non-cumulative resources, so we can build the
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cost relations from the EVM gas model and apply a standard resource analysis.
The sum of memory gas upper-bound and opcode gas upper-bound results in a valid
upper-bound for gas consumption. As we will study in Section 7.3, if this upper bound
is constant, it matches the real gas consumption.
Finally, Pubs [12] is the solver used to solve the cost equations system and to infer
the gas upper bound.
7.2 Oyente* implementation
Oyente is a symbolic execution tool that aims to find vulnerabilities in a smart contract.
It takes as an input the EVM bytecode and the global Ethereum state, and it returns the
possible vulnerabilities as a symbolic path.
Oyente is written entirely in Python. It has four main components: CFGBuilder,
Explorer, Core Analysis and Validator. CFGBuilder generates a skeleton CFG
i.e an incomplete CFG that is later used by Explorer to execute symbolically from a
concrete state. This component uses Z3 solver, a SMT-solver that can infer whether a
conditional branch is probably true or probably false to be taken. This way, it deter-
mines which path is more probable and it detects which paths are directly unfeasible,
by solving the constraints that have been detected for the condition while generating
the CFG. Symbolic traces are generated, so that Core Analysis detects which possible
vulnerabilities can be found. Finally, Validator certifies this decision, filtering possible
false positives from previous analysis.
In our case, we are only interested in building our analysis on top of the CFGBuilder.
In particular, we are just reusing the parser of the bytecode, and also adapting the code
in which the symbolic execution of EVM bytecode is performed. This way, the impact of
bytecodes, that was simulated through the updating function in Section 4.1, is directly
adapted from the existing code. Nevertheless, it is important to take into account that
this new updating function is much more complex than the one depicted before, as it also
records the impact of the bytecode in the memory and the storage. We have changed this
information to adapt it to our analysis. For instance, Z3 solver is no longer used to check
unfeasible paths, we just maintain the constraint representation in order to represent
unknown stack variables. Most of these changes had already been included in EthIR [1].
Therefore, we only need to implement the naive algorithm we discussed in Section 4.2.
Instead of solving first the constraint equation system and then generate the CFG, we will
be generating the CFG implicitly while performing the propagation of values, according
to the jump equations.
Before starting the execution, we join the bytecodes that belong to the same block
in a structure, so that we can execute all the instructions from a block directly. These
blocks are identified by the position of the first bytecode. When a block is copied, a
subindex is added to identify the copy. Each block copied has a unique identifier, so in
order to assign a new subindex when copying a block, we have included a map that links
each original block address with the next index available for copying it. If we are cloning
a previously cloned block, we remove its subindex and add the new one available. This
has been changed from previous implementation of Oyente*, that just added a new
subindex each time, making it difficult to identify blocks.
For each block generated (copied or not), we are going to maintain a map that links
its block address with its associated stack before executing the instructions within the
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block. This way, we can identify whether a new block must be generated or link current
iteration to a block that had already been generated in our analysis. We will clone the
block if its associated stack hasn’t been generated before, i.e there is no other previous
block whose stack is in the same equivalence class with current stack using the same
definition we used for the analysis.
We will also simulate memory and storage during symbolic execution. However, we
must note that in some cases, we will have to wipe them out, as we are analyzing the
contract as a whole, and we cannot keep track of these structures between transactions.
Now, we are going to describe how the cloning and the generation of the CFG is
performed. As we have stated before, instead of solving the equation system, we will
propagate the abstract states following these equations.
At first, we only consider the block corresponding to address 0 and the initial empty
stack. For each block, we execute symbolically all the bytecodes within it and obtain a
final stack. Once we reach the end of the block, we can find the following cases:
• Case (1) : we haven’t reached a final bytecode. This means next bytecode is the
beginning of another block. Therefore, before cloning next block, we retrieve all
blocks that are represented by this address (i.e the original block and its copies) and
compare their associated initial stacks with the final stack from current execution.
If another block shares the initial stack, we just update the CFG information by
adding an edge from current block to the already generated block. Otherwise, we
add a new node to the CFG representing the new cloned block and an edge that
points to it from the block before, and repeat the whole process with the new
generated block.
Depending on final bytecode, next block address is obtained in different ways:
– Last bytecode is JUMP : next block address corresponds to the top of the stack
before executing JUMP.
– Last bytecode is JUMPI : in this case, we have to explore the paths correspond-
ing to a taken branch, or not. Therefore, we recursively explore each of the
two cases: we consider as next block address both the jump target address
and current program counter plus one.
– Last bytecode is neither JUMP nor JUMPI. This means that no branch instruction
is performed, and therefore, next block address is the program counter plus
one.
• Case (2) : We have reached a final node. The analysis of current path is over, so
no further modifications are made.
From this algorithm, we obtain as an output a list of blocks that represent the nodes
of the CFG, and their associated edges. If we active -cfg flag when invoking oyente-ethir,
we will produce a .dot file to represent the CFG explicitly, an interesting feature for
debugging purposes. The block list is later passed to EthIR, that generates the RBR
representation from it.
Example 7.1. Figure 1.2 corresponds to the CFG of the contract in Figure 3.1. There
are two different figures, one with the .dot file when cloning was not considered and the
other after using our algorithm. We are going to analyze more in depth what the colors
of the node means.
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Function solc opcode bound Gastap memory bound Gastap
addresses(uint256) 1050 1035 15
array 815 800 15
getAddresses ∞ 1329+292·nat(addr-1/32) 6·nat(addr)+24+
+75·nat(addr+31/32)
⌊
(6·nat(addr)+24)2
512
⌋
map(address) 708 693 15
param 504 489 15
sum(uint256) ∞ 321 + 78·log2(2 + 5·n/4) 15
sumConstant ∞ 369 + 78 · log2(8.25) 15
sumConstructor ∞ 613 + 78·log2(2 + 5·c/4) 15
sumFail(uint256) ∞ 391 + failed(no rf) 9
sumFailConstantValue ∞ 2827 + 2/3 15
sumMapping ∞ 812 + 78 ·log2(1 + c(maximize failed)) 15
sumMemory ∞ 767 + 78 ·log2(1 + c(maximize failed)) 15
sumMod(uint256) ∞ 343 + 78·log2(2 + 5·n/7) 15
Figure 7.2: Gas bounds for Sums. Function nat defined as nat(l)= max(0,l).
Nodes have different color depending on its type. Green nodes represent terminal
nodes, and yellow nodes represent unconditional jumping with a JUMP instruction. Red
nodes are those blocks that contains no jump instruction, and they are followed by the
beginning of another block. Blue nodes represent those nodes whose last bytecode is JUMPI.
We annotate with a t the edge corresponding to evaluating its condition to True, and with
f otherwise.
All the modifications mentioned above can be found in https://github.com/costa-group/
EthIR. In particular, the main contributions to the repository have been done in symexec.py
file, as it is the module in which the symbolic execution is performed. Nevertheless, this
repository contains a version with only EthIR tool, as Gastap code hasn’t been pub-
licly released. An online version of gastap for testing different inputs can be found in
https://costa.fdi.ucm.es/gastap/.
Therefore, all commits made for implementing new analysis aren’t reflected in this
version of the tool. Instead, the contribution statistics can be found in https://github.
com/alexcere/EthIR, which is the forked branch in which the analysis was developed.
A total of 37 commits have been made to develop the algorithm, generating 8,883 new
lines of code and removing 5,249 lines.
7.3 Gas Bounds for Sums Case Study
In this example, instead of analyzing the contract in Figure 3.1, we are going to analyze
another different contract we have specifically designed to analyze the strengths and
weaknesses of Gastap tool.
Figure 7.2 shows the comparison between the gas bound provided by solc, the Solidity
compiler, and in the next two columns the bounds produced by Gastap for opcode gas
and memory gas, respectively, for all public functions in contract Sums. Its associated
code can be found in Figure 7.3.
First thing we must highlight is that functions with constant gas consumption accord-
ing to solc (addresses, array...) matches the sum of the gas and memory bounds we
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infer with Gastap. This shows that no precision is lost when analyzing contracts with
fixed gas consumption.
In the remaining cases, solc cannot determine gas consumption and returns ∞,
whereas Gastap is able to determine this bounds in some of them.
This is really remarkable with function sumConstant, that has a fixed upper bound
that couldn’t be found by solc. Before understanding the reasons of this behaviour,
we have to understand what sum function does. This function receives a uint n as a
parameter, and contains the following loop:
1 sol = 0;
2 uint j = 1;
3 while(sol <= 5∗n){
4 j = 3∗j + 1;
5 sol = j;
6 }
This loop iterates until the value of sol is greater than 5n, updating the value of j in
each iteration. It is clear that the number of iterations depends directly on the value of
n, and therefore, solc assumes the gas consumption is ∞. On the other side, Gastap
manages to infer the parametric opcode bound, that clearly depends on the value n.
This cost depends on a log2 function, which is a reasonable upper gas bound, as in each
iteration, j grows exponentially. Nevertheless, this is not a trivial estimation: in each
iteration, we multiply j by 3, but our bounds depends on log2 instead of log3. Besides,
inside the logarithm function, we have 5n/4 instead of 5n.
Most of the other functions call the sum function with values from different structures.
sumConstant calls with a constant value, thus obtaining a numerical result. This explains
why solc couldn’t obtain this value, as it calls a function with a looping that depends on
a parameter.
sumConstructor calls it with a public variable (param) in the storage that was ini-
tialized in the constructor. This value can be changed through a transaction, as we see
that we obtain bounds for param function. As we cannot guarantee current value when
executing a transaction, its bound depends on a parameter that represents it.
sumMapping and sumMemory use variables that are stored in an map and an array,
respectively. We have already noted that persistant information from storage is lost
when performing Saco. Therefore, we obtain a maximize failed error when trying to
perform the analysis.
In function sumMod, we have slightly modified function sum above, to analyze how small
modifications can affect the bounds obtained. In particular, we have just initialized j to
2 instead of 1. The opcode bound inferred differs from the one obtained before: now
we have 5n/7 instead of 5n/4. Clearly, this new bound is always smaller than the one
obtained before, as we could expect from initializing the loop with a bigger value. This
shows our tool greatly adapts its bounds to the information provided, tightening as much
as possible this bound.
Finally, we have defined a function called sumFail, that intends to generate failed
analysis on purpose. At first sight, it doesn’t differ much from the ones above:
1 function sumFail (uint n) public returns (uint sol ){
2 sol = 0;
3 for(uint j = 0; j <= 100; j += n)
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4 sol += 10;
5 }
The main difference is that now we add n to j in each step. This proves fatal for the
analysis, as we obtain no rf as a result, that indicated its failure. This is because if n is
0, it theoretically does not terminate.
However, if we now call the contract with a constant value (contract sumFailConstantValue
), we obtain a valid result. What’s the reason of this behaviour? In the first case, we try
to add an unknown value to j, crashing when performing the equations. In the second
case, this value is known and it isn’t modified between iterations, thus generating valid
costs.
Note that the results presented in this section do not add the so called intrinsic gas
cost of the execution as Solidity compiler does. However, Gastap has a flag to incorporate
the transaction fee of 2,300 gas.
1
2 pragma solidity ˆ0.4.11;
3
4 contract Sums {
5
6 uint public param;
7 uint [] public array ;
8 mapping (address => uint) public map;
9 address [] public addresses ;
10
11
12 constructor () public {
13 param = 3;
14 array [0] = 2;
15 map[msg.sender] = 4;
16 }
17
18 function getAddresses() public view returns (address []) {
19 return addresses ;
20 }
21
22 function sumConstructor() public returns (uint sol ){
23 sol = sum(param);
24 }
25
26 function sumMemory() public returns (uint sol){
27 sol = sum(array[0]) ;
28 }
29
30 function sumConstant() public returns (uint sol ){
31 sol = sum(5);
32 }
1
2 function sumMapping() public returns (uint sol){
3 sol = sum(map[msg.sender]);
4 }
5
6 function sumFailConstantValue() public returns (uint sol ){
7 sol = sumFail(3);
8 }
9
10 function sum (uint n) public returns (uint sol ) {
11 sol = 0;
12 uint j = 1;
13 while(sol <= 5∗n){
14 j = 3∗j + 1;
15 sol = j;
16 }
17 }
18
19 function sumMod (uint n) public returns (uint sol) {
20 sol = 0;
21 uint j = 2;
22 while(sol <= 5∗n){
23 j = 3∗j + 1;
24 sol = j;
25 }
26 }
27
28 function sumFail (uint n) public returns (uint sol ){
29 sol = 0;
30 for(uint j = 0; j <= 100; j += n)
31 sol += 10;
32 }
33
34 }
Figure 7.3: Solidity code for sums example contract

Chapter 8
Evaluation
In Section 8.1, a brief explanation on how the experiments have been performed is in-
cluded. Experiments have been separated in two different sections: in Section 8.2, we
compare the performance of our analysis with the previous version of Oyente*, and in
Section 8.3, we discuss the overall efficiency and effectiveness of Gastap tool including
our algorithm.
8.1 Experiments generation
In this subsection, we are going to detail how experiments were carried out. Two type of
experiments have been carried out: we have analyzed for which contracts Oyente* fails,
and we have also analyzed the overall performance of Gastap tool with our analysis.
Our experimental setup consists on 34,460 contracts taken from the blockchain as
follows. We pulled all Ethereum contracts from the blockchain of January 2018 using
Etherscan service [7], removed duplicates, and after that, those smart contracts that lead
to a compiler error due to a lower version of the compiler.
This process led to obtaining 10,796 files. The whole dataset used can be found at
https://github.com/costa-group/EthIR/tree/master/examples/gastap.
In both cases, we have used Bash scripts to carry out the experiments. This way,
we can execute uninterruptedly the tools for each of our files, classify the files depending
on the outcome of the execution and generate log files with the information we need to
quantify.
Experiments have been performed on an Intel Core i7-7700T at 2.9GHz x 8 and 7.7GB
of Memory, running Ubuntu 16.04. Gastap and EthIR accepts smart contracts written
in versions of Solidity up to 0.5.15 or bytecode for the Ethereum Virtual Machine v1.8.18.
The results of Oyente* are discussed in Section 8.2. In this case, we have considered
all the files, and the results are expressed in terms of files analyzed instead of contracts.
We have considered this approach because there can be some contracts that inherit from
other contracts, or can invoke transactions of another contract in the same file. Therefore,
dependencies between contracts in the same file can exist, so we don’t consider isolated
contracts when studying whether the compilation fails or not.
The results of Gastap overall performance can be found in Section 8.3. In this case,
we have excluded the files where the decompilation phase fails in any of the contracts it
includes, since in that case we do not get any information on the whole file. As a result,
we obtain 9,659 files that contain 34,460 contracts. In total, we have analyzed 318,093
public functions (and all auxiliary functions that are used from them).
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Type of results #files old %files old #files new %files new
Files decompiled correctly 9658 89.46% 8737 80,93%
Oyente* error 1102 10,21% 2023 18,74 %
Time out 35 0,32 % 35 0,32%
Unknown error 1 0,01% 1 0,01%
RBR Error 0 0% 0 0%
SACO Error 0 0% 0 0%
Total number of files 10796 100% 10796 100%
Type of Oyente* errors #files old %files old #files new %files new
Compiler error 1036 9,60 % 1036 9,60%
CFG Generation error 66 0,61% 158 1,46%
Cloning error 0 0% 829 7,68%
Total number of files 1102 10,21% 2023 18,74%
Figure 8.1: (Top) Comparison between old and new analysis results when using EthIR.
(Bottom) Reason breakdown for Oyente* errors.
8.2 Oyente* statistics
The results of our analysis in Oyente* are reflected in Figure 8.1. In this figure, we
measure the impact our analysis have had in the overall performance.
Columns #files old and #files new contain the number of files that have been
analyzed using the previous version of Oyente* and the version presented in this project.
Columns preceded by % represent the impact each possible outcome of the analysis has
in the overall dataset.
The number of files that are correctly decompiled have been increased from 8737
to 9658, resulting in a 10.54% improvement. Note that we are comparing only those
files that couldn’t be analyzed before because an error occurred during the analysis, so
previous contracts that were wrongly generated aren’t considered. There is also a huge
improvement in the number of files that couldn’t even generate its CFG: we have gone
from 2023 to 1102 (45,53% improvement).
Most of them now correspond to those contracts that cannot be compiled by solc
compiler, because they correspond to contracts that can only be compiled by newer
version of solc. By not considering these files in the performance, we obtain that only
1,05% of all the files analyzed fails. This number is smaller than the failure rate of other
tools like Vandal [13] (5% of failure rate), Oyente [4] (10% of failure rate) and Rattle [14]
(30% of failure rate) or the previous prototype of EthIR [2] (7% of failure rate).
Now we may wonder why our analysis still fails. The files we are interested in inspect-
ing correspond to the 66 files with a CFG generation error. There aren’t either many files
to consider, so we have studied the error message we obtain from their execution with
Oyente* and classified the types of errors:
• Z3 cannot support too deep recursion:
This is the most common error we get among the remaining files. Z3 cannot handle
well recursions when the level is too deep. In those contracts with many different
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functions, hundreds of blocks are considered in our analysis. As we keep using the
Z3 representation for unknown stack variables, some of this contracts just fail when
generating the CFG.
We decided to keep this representation for a better understanding on the constraints
in the conditions in the bytecode. Nevertheless, we are planning to shift to an easier
representation of unknown value, as we are not using the SMT-solver for removing
possible paths.
• High level order function:
This is the least common error: only two contracts have this error, and both con-
tracts are essentially the same in terms of Solidity code. This is one of the few cases
in which the address of a jump bytecode is not obtained through a PUSHx instruction
directly: the value is previously stored in the memory, loaded from it and applied
a mask to compute the jump target address. We cannot keep track of this value,
thus reaching a point where analysis just fails.
• Handling strings :
Again, this is really similar to high level order function. We try to store the address
before performing the jump, but an error is raised because the memory address
where the value is going to be stored is too big for Python to simulate.
• Non-terminating recursive function:
The last case corresponds to a simple recursive function that never ends. In this
case, when generating the CFG, we encounter a block that makes an unconditional
jump to itself, and pushes several values during its execution. Therefore, no two
stacks are the same between the different calls, and the stack will reach its limit of
1024 elements. We haven’t taken into consideration this case in our implementation,
as in this case, an exception is raised, so the analysis would fail anyway.
8.3 Gastap Statistics
Figure 8.2 shows the final results when analyzing our experiments with Gastap. Columns
#opc and %opc represent the number of functions analyzed for opcode gas bounds,
and the percentage of each possible outcome respectively. Columns #mem and %mem
represent the same results for memory gas bounds.
Our results are very promising, as our success rate is 90,24% in case of opcode per-
formance, and 91,95% for memory bounds. In both cases, most of the contracts have
a constant gas bound, showing that most contracts contain simple instructions. This
behaviour is the one recommended, as we have already discussed, having possible infinite
gas consumption leads to out-of-gas exceptions.
We also have a considerable number of contracts with parametric gas bounds, which
are subject to not be included to blocks in the blockchain due to exceeding the amount
of gas allowed for a transaction.
Timeout error has been obtained from those contracts that took more than 30s to
analyze. The rest of errors are quite technical due to other intermediate tools used, so we
won’t go into detail since they are not related to my dissertation. A further discussion
will be given in Gastap journal yet to be published.
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Type of result #opc %opc #mem %mem
Constant gas bound 266,401 83.75% 274,969 86.44%
Parametric gas bound 20,648 6.49% 17,518 5.51%
Time out 19,935 6.27% 18,086 5.69%
Finite gas bound (maximization error) 9,189 2.89% 7,520 2.36%
Termination unknown (ranking function error) 1,685 0.53% 0 0%
Complex control flow (cover point error) 235 0.07% 0 0%
Total number of functions 318,093 100% 318,093 100%
Phase Topcode (s) Tmem (s) Ttotal (s) %opc %mem %total
CFG generation — — 20.92 — — 0.0014%
RBR generation — — 1.25 — — 0.0001%
Size analysis — — 132,701 — — 9.05%
Generation of gas eqs. 175,824 154,529 330,353 11.99% 10.53% 22.52%
Solving gas eqs. 478,506 525,445 1,003,951 32.61% 35.82% 68.43%
Total time Gastap 1,467,027.17 100%
Figure 8.2: (Top) Statistics of gas usage on the analyzed 34,460 smart contracts from
Ethereum blockchain. (Bottom) Timing breakdown for Gastap on the analyzed 34,460
smart contracts.
As far as efficiency is concerned, results are found in the bottom table in Figure 8.2.
In total, the experiments have taken 1,467,027.17 sec (407.5 hours).
It is really significant that our analysis has only taken 0,0014% of the total execution.
This fact shows the efficiency of our algorithm, which together with its effectiveness
discussed in Section 8.2, proves it can be really useful for other tools that rely on the
CFG generation.
Chapter 9
Conclusions and Future Work
Ethereum has become really popular in the last years, becoming its token Ether the second
most valuable cryptocurrency, just after Bitcoin. However, we can expect Ethereum to
surpass Bitcoin in a near future, as it has a main advantage over Bitcoin: it allows users
to deploy dApps on top of it, and program their own smart contracts. There is still many
possibilities within smart contracts that haven’t probably been considered yet, and we
will have to wait some years to see all their potential and possible applications in people’s
daily life.
Nevertheless, when deploying a contract in Ethereum, we have to be really careful
that no vulnerabilities can be triggered when performing a transaction. This is a real
danger, and probably the most famous example of it is the DAO attack.
The DAO implemented a decentralized autonomous organization that let anybody
invest Ether in exchange for DAO tokens, so that this Ether could be used for funding in
projects that could be voted by the community. An exploit that allowed a user to ask for
its investment back multiple times was found by a hacker, allowing them to steal millions
of dollars worth Ether. The reason of this bug was simple: the contract returned first the
Ether funds to its owner, and then the balance was updated. This episode was heavily
discussed in the community, and led to a hardfork resulting in Ethereum Classic to get
the Ether back.
One of the main reasons why decentralized technologies are becoming more and more
used nowadays is to be able to exchange information knowing that no centralized party
can take control over it. If trust over a tool is lost, then the spirit of using it is destroyed,
leading to nobody wanting to take part in it.
This is the reason why formal methods are extremely important in this context. Mul-
tiple attempts are being made in order to guarantee safety and reliance, and as a result,
multiple tools have been developed. Being such a delicate task, we need to ensure that
algorithms involved are correct, which can be only achieved by applying formal methods
for analysis. This dissertation aims to provide a correct framework that can be useful to
develop these algorithms, as control-flow graphs are a necessary tool to reach this goal.
Our algorithm presented is simple and easy to implement, yet sound. Besides, having
proven completeness with the handling-jumps semantics, gives us which are the cases in
which accuracy is lost. Thus, we have control over the cases in which we lose information.
Gastap results in Section 8.3 corroborate the robustness of the analysis: nearly 99%
of the total of files considered are correctly decompiled and Gastap manages to correctly
infer upper bounds for more than 90% of the functions. We expect these numbers to arise
in future developments, when some of the problems addressed in Section 8.2 are finally
51
52 CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
overcome. Nevertheless, we cannot expect to have a 100% success rate, as the peculiarities
of non-persistent information in EVM code prevent from resolving all the problems.
Further development of this work will be focused in adapting the analysis to newer
versions of Solidity code. Solidity is constantly evolving and updating versions, being
difficult to maintain an up-to-date tool. Nevertheless, we have already developed a general
structure of the analysis, so we would just need to update to newer versions of Solidity.
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